The civic generation came of age during the Depression and WWII. They are a highly civically engage generation--yet why? In the wake of a macro social capital decline, in order to understand why its declining we need to understand why the "greatest generation" was so great. Mettler and Welch suggest a policy feedback theory--one that combines the macro level and micro level observations (historical institutionism and behavioralism)--can lend an explanation to why that particular generation was and is so great.
Policy feedback effects:
Policies themselves shape subsequent political activity. Thus policies have the potential to "make" citizens... citizens that would have refrained from political activity, had a policy that affected them not been instated, now have motive to participate.
Paul Pierson heads this theory, in political science. policies "make" citizens in two ways:
(1) resource effects: policies give citizens resources that might not have had without the policy
(2) interpretive effects: policies also convey meaning; for example, the GI Bill was an indicator to veterans that the government wanted to reward them for their service with free education. Similarly, welfare policy somewhat demeans recipients, making their feel less than worthy of the "handouts" and a number of theories suggest this is one reason welfare recipients are less likely to be political engaged/active.
Mettler takes Pierson's resource effects and interpretive effects a bit farther to suggest the resource effects enables our capacities (skills etc.), and intrepretive effects have a psychological effect (see the above example about welfare, I gave).
Research Design:
Case Study: GI Bill--utilized by over 50% of veterans.
Three successive Time periods:
1950-1964
1964-1979
1980-1998
Hypotheses:
the GI Bill with have an "interpretive" effect for the 1950-1964 respondents; these respondents' memories of the benefits from government are the most salient. thus appreciating the GI Bill, and understanding it is from government, this generation of respondents are more likely to be active on account of that.
the later generations are more likely to be political active on account of "resource" effects; now well into their years, the GI Bill enabled them to get an education--it is this education that has brought them resources tantamount to SES resources which lead to high levels of political activity.
Findings:
confirmed; interpretive effects lead GI Bill recipients to be politically active from 1950-1964; then those who went on to use the GI Bill for higher education maintained political activity (from 1964-1998) on account of resource effects.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Monday, May 26, 2008
Shuman and Rodgers (2004) Cohorts, Chronology, and Collective Memories
Abstract:
We asked Americans to tell us the national and world events that they believe to have been especially important sive the 1930s, using replicated cross-section surveys carried out in 1985, in 2000 and after september 11, 2001. Our primary interests are, first, in how collective memoies change as new events occur, such as the eold of the COld war or the 9/11 terrorist attacks; and second, in whether the origin of such memries during the critical period of adolescence ad early adulthood, as well as their connetion with education, remain stable over time and constisent with theory. As part of our investigation we consider four related issues: collective forgetting as as well collective remembering; the distinction between ease of recalling events and judgments of their importance; compound events, wic are composed of sub-events tat can be remembered separately by respnodents; and larger social and technologcal changes difficult or impossible to date with any precision. Panel data frm the second and third surveys, obtain sdhortly after 911, air in determining which earlier collective memories were superseded by memories of the terrorist attack itself.
memories of earlier events come into competition with more recent events; which are most pronounced when forces to recall them? TO what extent is this recall connected to two social background variables: education and cohort experience?
Our youth is a "critical period." experiences during our adolescence have an especially strong impact on memory. Learning about events second hand (i.e. learning about the depression in history class) is not nearly the same as learning about the depression by living through it (218). yet, events experienced when one is old, and hardened in their ways and opinions, are also less likely to have a substantial impact. thus we see experience, as well as age, determine an event's impact on an individuald values/attitudes. "moreover, an onging event stimulates conversations with others that also enhance memory" (219).
Changes in the Events Americans Remember as Important (223):
from 1985-2000
from 2000-2001
We asked Americans to tell us the national and world events that they believe to have been especially important sive the 1930s, using replicated cross-section surveys carried out in 1985, in 2000 and after september 11, 2001. Our primary interests are, first, in how collective memoies change as new events occur, such as the eold of the COld war or the 9/11 terrorist attacks; and second, in whether the origin of such memries during the critical period of adolescence ad early adulthood, as well as their connetion with education, remain stable over time and constisent with theory. As part of our investigation we consider four related issues: collective forgetting as as well collective remembering; the distinction between ease of recalling events and judgments of their importance; compound events, wic are composed of sub-events tat can be remembered separately by respnodents; and larger social and technologcal changes difficult or impossible to date with any precision. Panel data frm the second and third surveys, obtain sdhortly after 911, air in determining which earlier collective memories were superseded by memories of the terrorist attack itself.
memories of earlier events come into competition with more recent events; which are most pronounced when forces to recall them? TO what extent is this recall connected to two social background variables: education and cohort experience?
Our youth is a "critical period." experiences during our adolescence have an especially strong impact on memory. Learning about events second hand (i.e. learning about the depression in history class) is not nearly the same as learning about the depression by living through it (218). yet, events experienced when one is old, and hardened in their ways and opinions, are also less likely to have a substantial impact. thus we see experience, as well as age, determine an event's impact on an individuald values/attitudes. "moreover, an onging event stimulates conversations with others that also enhance memory" (219).
Changes in the Events Americans Remember as Important (223):
from 1985-2000
from 2000-2001
Mishler and Rose (2007) Generation, Age, and TIme: The Dynamics of Political Learning durning Russia's Transformation
Abstract:
hen the Soviet Union colapsed, most Russians had lived teir entire lives in a quientessiantlly authoritaritna culture. Hanving neen socialized in this envormnment, how could citizens acquire the attitudes and behaviors necessary to suppor a new, most pluralistic regime? Cultural theries of political learning emphasize the primacy of childhood socilaization and hold that altering initual attitudes is a decades-long process that depends on generational replacement. Institutional theories emphasize adult relearning in response to changing circumstances regardless of socialization. Lifetime learning integratres the competing persoectives. Mutilevel modesls sing New Russia Rarometer data from 1992 to 2005 confirm the persistence of some generational differences in Russian political attitudes but demonstrate even larger effects resulting from adult relearning. Lifetime learning provides the most comprehensive account ad suggest that Russian wold quickly acquire the attitudes and behaviors appropriate to democracy--if Russian elites supply more authentic democratic institutions.
the strength of the shock! matters. this is how you "get" adults.
Political learning and relearning
cultural theories emphasize early learning; youth are indoctrinated; and are also taught indirectly, and unconsciously. thus political attitudes are deeply ingrained and unlikely to change, especially as time goes on.
at the forefront of this theory is the "primacy principle:" early life scialization trumps later life socialization (searing, wright and rabonowitz 1976).
yet differences in gender, ethnicity and family position can produce important variations in socialization.
institutional theories emphasize adult political experiences based on contemporary institutions and circumstances. this theory holds that attitudes are malleable and adaptable. thus later life experiences play an equal, nay, a greater role in determining political attitudes and opinions. here it is the "structure principle:" attitudes learned early in life interpret and shape later life learning in a classic path-dependent process reinforcing early life socialization.
life time leaning theory emphasizes the importance of both culture and institutions. according to this perspective, the political lessons of childhood are variously reinforced, revised, or replaced over time by later life experiences. thus this theory tests the durability of early learning in the face of later life experiences on political attitudes and behaviors.
Generations:
(1) survival
(2) normal
(4) transitional
Dependent Variables:
(1) Attitudes toward old regime (authoritarian)
(2) Attitudes toward new regime (democratic)
There are at least two reasons why generations are important--
(1) historical--
All generational in society may be socialized broadly into a common political culture, but different aspects of that culture may be emphasized depending upon the particular histirocal environment (war, depresssion etc.) within which differnt cohorts were socialized.
(2) social and economic conditions-
Class notes:
This does not look mannheimian. Altough the socialization account may be Mannheimian, it is more incremental/gradual change.
hen the Soviet Union colapsed, most Russians had lived teir entire lives in a quientessiantlly authoritaritna culture. Hanving neen socialized in this envormnment, how could citizens acquire the attitudes and behaviors necessary to suppor a new, most pluralistic regime? Cultural theries of political learning emphasize the primacy of childhood socilaization and hold that altering initual attitudes is a decades-long process that depends on generational replacement. Institutional theories emphasize adult relearning in response to changing circumstances regardless of socialization. Lifetime learning integratres the competing persoectives. Mutilevel modesls sing New Russia Rarometer data from 1992 to 2005 confirm the persistence of some generational differences in Russian political attitudes but demonstrate even larger effects resulting from adult relearning. Lifetime learning provides the most comprehensive account ad suggest that Russian wold quickly acquire the attitudes and behaviors appropriate to democracy--if Russian elites supply more authentic democratic institutions.
the strength of the shock! matters. this is how you "get" adults.
Political learning and relearning
cultural theories emphasize early learning; youth are indoctrinated; and are also taught indirectly, and unconsciously. thus political attitudes are deeply ingrained and unlikely to change, especially as time goes on.
at the forefront of this theory is the "primacy principle:" early life scialization trumps later life socialization (searing, wright and rabonowitz 1976).
yet differences in gender, ethnicity and family position can produce important variations in socialization.
institutional theories emphasize adult political experiences based on contemporary institutions and circumstances. this theory holds that attitudes are malleable and adaptable. thus later life experiences play an equal, nay, a greater role in determining political attitudes and opinions. here it is the "structure principle:" attitudes learned early in life interpret and shape later life learning in a classic path-dependent process reinforcing early life socialization.
life time leaning theory emphasizes the importance of both culture and institutions. according to this perspective, the political lessons of childhood are variously reinforced, revised, or replaced over time by later life experiences. thus this theory tests the durability of early learning in the face of later life experiences on political attitudes and behaviors.
Generations:
(1) survival
(2) normal
(4) transitional
Dependent Variables:
(1) Attitudes toward old regime (authoritarian)
(2) Attitudes toward new regime (democratic)
There are at least two reasons why generations are important--
(1) historical--
All generational in society may be socialized broadly into a common political culture, but different aspects of that culture may be emphasized depending upon the particular histirocal environment (war, depresssion etc.) within which differnt cohorts were socialized.
(2) social and economic conditions-
Class notes:
This does not look mannheimian. Altough the socialization account may be Mannheimian, it is more incremental/gradual change.
Jennings and Stoker (2008) f time and the development of partisan polarization in the United States
Jennings, M. Kent and Laura Stoker. Of time and the development of partisan polarization in the United States. American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Overview:
Jennings and Stoker provide a new understanding of mass partisan polarization at the aggregate level and of political socialization dynamics at the individual level, wrought by tying these two topics together. individual-level and aggregate-level mass partisan polarization at the aggregate level and of political socialization dynamics at the individual level offer new insights into how partisan polarization varies across time, generations and issues. They propose individuals are less open to change beyond young adulthood. They rely on results from Jennings' long-term panel study, after which they use simulations to generate expectations about how these developments play out across cohorts, issues and time. These expectations are evaluated through a cohort analysis of NES data (1972-2004).
Introduction:
Converse (1969) created a model that helped account for the emergence of partisan stability in varying national contexts over time.
Model:
(1) Generational replacement: Racial reorganization of partisan identification was a slow-moving phenomenon largely fed by population replacement
(2) Individual-level change: Voters have become much better sorted into political parties as elites have become ideologically more distinct
(3) Parties acquire more distinctive issue-based positions: stable partisans gradually coming to embrace the issue stances that their preferred party advocates.
Goal: Provide new understanding of mass partisan polarization at aggregate level and of political socialization dynamics at individual level by tying these two topics together.
· Socialization: join ideas about age-related attitudinal crystallization with age-related, cohort-specific gains in party-issue constraint.
· Partisan polarization in the electorate: examine interaction between individual-level and generational replacement dynamics.
· Consider micro- and the macro-level mechanisms fueling issue-based differences between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate
Micro-Macro Links Model (3 working parts)
(1) Converse's learning resistance phenomenon: Openness to political learning and attitude change declines with age in a non-linear fashion
· 2 conceptions of life-span stability: (a) impressionable years version and (b) mid-life stability
o Fluctuations during late adolescent and young adult years à stage of crystallization à incremental gains well into middle age via experience à increased stability by middle age
(2) Stable political parties leads to constraint between partisan affiliation and issue positions, which will climb with age, non-linearly
Continuing experience with the political system increases partisan attachment
(3) Marked alterations and increases in the nature of partisan cleavages will gradually manifest themselves in the mass electorate
Methodology:
They rely on results from Jennings' 4-wave panel study, after which they use simulations to generate expectations about how these developments play out across cohorts, issues and time. These expectations are evaluated through a cohort analysis of NES data (1972-2004). They do this because although the 4-wave socialization panel data can test propositions about the strengthening of political attitudes and the relationship between these attitudes and partisanship as individuals age, they can't capture the emergence and evolution of partisanship/issue ties across multiple cohorts coming of age under different configurations of issue-based party cleavages.
The Stability of Political Affiliations and Attitudes
Less attitudinal continuity evident as the youth aged from 18 to 26. Continuity more pronounced over the next decade. Gains remained in place as youth aged from 35-50 à "plateauing" effect
Make-shift life span ordering: Then they combine ("splice") the youth and parent panels. In 8 of the 11 measures, there are early gains then gradual increases or little or no change over the remaining years.
3 exceptions:
(1) Parental PID stability substantially exceeds that found in the younger generation
(2) Much lower parental stability with respect to the newer issues represented by evaluation of the women's movement and the legalization of marijuana
The Linkage of Issue Positions and Party Identification
*The findings are in Table 2. They find a dramatic rise with respect to ideological identification over time. Plausible hypotheses include: (1) political learning processes associated with aging and (2) period effects associated with more distinctive partisan divisions. They will test these next.
Simulating Developmental and Period Effects in Party-Issue Constraint
(1) The first scenario assumes the party's positions were constant between 1930-2000, and they find the extent of the party cleavage in the electorate, indexed by the average constraint coefficient is constant over time.
(2) The second scenario assumes the party's positions diverged after 1970, and they find (a) the older cohorts are less responsive, less open to change than are the younger cohorts and (b) cohort differences grow over time. Whereas initial cohort differences are inconsequential, they are dramatic at the end of the period and display a pronounced curvilinear pattern. The highest level of constraint occurs in the 1970 cohort, which was just coming of age when the new party difference emerged.
(3) It is the interaction of life cycle, developmental process and a new political environment that?eventually?produces a distinctive "70s generation."
In this simulation the party difference emerges in 1970 and is stable subsequently. Nevertheless, the population continues to polarize on the issues for three reasons.
First, the operation of developmental processes, as people slowly adjust to the new political reality by modifying their issue attitudes and/or partisan affiliations.
Second, it reflects the process of population replacement in that new entrants to the polity evidence more constraint than do those who are exiting.
Third, and most interestingly, the heightened polarization reflects the interaction between generation formation and developmental processes. At first, new entrants look hardly more polarized than those exiting. But the polity is losing people who do not develop and is replacing them with people who do develop as they age. As a result, the population replacement engine produces effects that are increasingly felt as the developmental process plays itself out. Overall, partisan polarization in the 2000 electorate is the consequence of an event taking place thirty years earlier, an event whose full effects will not be felt until well after the pre-1970s cohorts are fully replaced.
(3) In the final simulation, the party difference is modeled as emerging in 1970 and then continuing to expand. The patterns found in this case (Table 5) are similar to those seen in table 4, with four significant differences.
First, constraint grows more rapidly over time within each cohort.
Second, constraint develops even more quickly for new cohorts facing a highly polarized partisan environment than for those facing a moderately polarized partisan environment, producing cohort differences not seen in Table 4.
Third, and as a consequence, enhanced cross-sectional cohort differences appear, especially as time passes.
Finally, the overall partisan polarization level grows at a faster rate than seen in the previous simulation, and by 2000 is larger.
The Rise of Partisan Polarization in the Electorate
*Table 7 contains the results.Results demonstrate that individuals develop greater consistency between their partisan affiliation and their issue commitment as they age, with the greatest gains usually coming in early adulthood. They also suggest that party differences on these longstanding issues have been growing, in contrast to the steady state modeled in simulation one.
Race and gender issues: The pattern changes where party divergence came in the 1960s and early 1970s (second panel of Table 7). As with our second and third simulations, cohort differences are initially minimal, as the 1972-1976 column shows, but eventually become pronounced and assume a curvilinear shape.
Patterning for these issues is similar to that found for the New Deal issues.
First, constraint gains are typically highest in early adulthood.
Second, each succeeding cohort is entering the electorate with a closer alignment between their party affiliation and their views on race and gender issues. As a consequence, by the last surveys the younger cohorts look very much like those who preceded them, save for the oldest cohort.
Results more striking for cultural issues index.
(1) Constraint levels begin at near zero in 1972-1976 for all cohorts. They climb steadily across the period, but especially for the cohort coming of age in the mid-1970s. The older cohorts lag behind; they have too much political experience from another era. The younger cohorts lag behind; they have not yet developed crystallized partisan or other political attitudes.
(2) Initial cohort differences: Each succeeding cohort entering the electorate shows higher constraint levels than the proceeding one. The partisanship of Americans socialized before the 1960s, has been, and remains, primarily tied to their positions on New Deal issues that have long divided the parties. The results for the youngest cohort are especially striking in the prominence of cultural issues, where the coefficient nearly matches that found for the New Deal issues.
The "new" issues involving race, gender, and culture, taken together, are becoming ever more important over time and across generation without supplanting traditional issue concerns.
As new entrants face a political environment where the partisan differences are not only evident on more issues but are also becoming clearer, partisan affiliations become increasingly aligned with a diverse set of issue commitments. Simultaneously, the power of cultural issues in defining Americans' partisanship is beginning to outweigh that of issues concerning race and gender.
In the 1970s and 1980s opinions on cultural issues were mostly disconnected from partisan affiliations, though attitudes about race and gender were seemingly influential. By the late 1980s and especially in the past decade, the pattern has reversed.
For each cohort save one the connection between cultural issues has grown stronger and has come to outstrip the connection based on race and gender issues.
Cultural issues in the electorate can only be expected to exacerbate the partisan cleavage, especially as new impressionable generations enter the electorate replacing those for whom cultural issues have little bearing on their partisan affiliations.
Conclusion:
The study of general age-related political maturations processes, life-cycle events and secular movements is important for what it reveals about individuals and the political system. The American electorate will reflect changes in political parties, but it may take some time before these changes emerge. Those who come of age when new party division emerge will be the strongest among all age groups. If party differences become increasingly accentuated over time, the "constraint" levels of young adults will match or exceed those of their politically experienced elders.
The general public has adopted elite-level partisan cleavages over time, but there isn't a simple explanation for this phenomenon. Over the past 30-40 years, there has been an interaction effect among (1) generational replacement of those less polarized by those more polarized, (2) increased polarization at the individual level over time and (3) by the conjunction of these mechanisms as the population became increasingly composed of cohorts that entered the electorate in the wake of new party divisions.
Put differently, "Beneath the clear over-time growth in ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate is a dynamic process that varies across time, across issues, and across generations" (Jennings & Stoker, 2008, 24).
There is a historical explanation for the emergence of partisan polarization in the electorate, and for the prominent variation across cohorts as of 1996-2004.
Implications:
Partisan polarization likely to increase (issues: race, gender and cultural matters). Americans' opinions strongly linked with Party ID. This isn't likely to change.
Research Opportunities:
(1) What cues are the public receiving about party differences? Origin of cues?
(2) Does the simple top-down representation of the elite-mass influence process miss dynamics working the other way?
(3) More complete explanations (e.g. political awareness and engagement) for how people develop over the life cycle (other than aging).
(4) Causal mechanisms: Is party ID shaping issue commitments? This would signal partisan polarization and realignment. Or are issue commitments shaping party ID? How does the strength of pre-adult socialization moderate causal dynamics? How do influence flows vary by age? Across generations?
(5) Generalizability across polities?How well does our model (and dynamics we have developed) apply to the party contexts outside of the US? Will be contingent on character, stability of political parties competing within a nation.
Overview:
Jennings and Stoker provide a new understanding of mass partisan polarization at the aggregate level and of political socialization dynamics at the individual level, wrought by tying these two topics together. individual-level and aggregate-level mass partisan polarization at the aggregate level and of political socialization dynamics at the individual level offer new insights into how partisan polarization varies across time, generations and issues. They propose individuals are less open to change beyond young adulthood. They rely on results from Jennings' long-term panel study, after which they use simulations to generate expectations about how these developments play out across cohorts, issues and time. These expectations are evaluated through a cohort analysis of NES data (1972-2004).
Introduction:
Converse (1969) created a model that helped account for the emergence of partisan stability in varying national contexts over time.
Model:
(1) Generational replacement: Racial reorganization of partisan identification was a slow-moving phenomenon largely fed by population replacement
(2) Individual-level change: Voters have become much better sorted into political parties as elites have become ideologically more distinct
(3) Parties acquire more distinctive issue-based positions: stable partisans gradually coming to embrace the issue stances that their preferred party advocates.
Goal: Provide new understanding of mass partisan polarization at aggregate level and of political socialization dynamics at individual level by tying these two topics together.
· Socialization: join ideas about age-related attitudinal crystallization with age-related, cohort-specific gains in party-issue constraint.
· Partisan polarization in the electorate: examine interaction between individual-level and generational replacement dynamics.
· Consider micro- and the macro-level mechanisms fueling issue-based differences between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate
Micro-Macro Links Model (3 working parts)
(1) Converse's learning resistance phenomenon: Openness to political learning and attitude change declines with age in a non-linear fashion
· 2 conceptions of life-span stability: (a) impressionable years version and (b) mid-life stability
o Fluctuations during late adolescent and young adult years à stage of crystallization à incremental gains well into middle age via experience à increased stability by middle age
(2) Stable political parties leads to constraint between partisan affiliation and issue positions, which will climb with age, non-linearly
Continuing experience with the political system increases partisan attachment
(3) Marked alterations and increases in the nature of partisan cleavages will gradually manifest themselves in the mass electorate
Methodology:
They rely on results from Jennings' 4-wave panel study, after which they use simulations to generate expectations about how these developments play out across cohorts, issues and time. These expectations are evaluated through a cohort analysis of NES data (1972-2004). They do this because although the 4-wave socialization panel data can test propositions about the strengthening of political attitudes and the relationship between these attitudes and partisanship as individuals age, they can't capture the emergence and evolution of partisanship/issue ties across multiple cohorts coming of age under different configurations of issue-based party cleavages.
The Stability of Political Affiliations and Attitudes
Less attitudinal continuity evident as the youth aged from 18 to 26. Continuity more pronounced over the next decade. Gains remained in place as youth aged from 35-50 à "plateauing" effect
Make-shift life span ordering: Then they combine ("splice") the youth and parent panels. In 8 of the 11 measures, there are early gains then gradual increases or little or no change over the remaining years.
3 exceptions:
(1) Parental PID stability substantially exceeds that found in the younger generation
(2) Much lower parental stability with respect to the newer issues represented by evaluation of the women's movement and the legalization of marijuana
The Linkage of Issue Positions and Party Identification
*The findings are in Table 2. They find a dramatic rise with respect to ideological identification over time. Plausible hypotheses include: (1) political learning processes associated with aging and (2) period effects associated with more distinctive partisan divisions. They will test these next.
Simulating Developmental and Period Effects in Party-Issue Constraint
(1) The first scenario assumes the party's positions were constant between 1930-2000, and they find the extent of the party cleavage in the electorate, indexed by the average constraint coefficient is constant over time.
(2) The second scenario assumes the party's positions diverged after 1970, and they find (a) the older cohorts are less responsive, less open to change than are the younger cohorts and (b) cohort differences grow over time. Whereas initial cohort differences are inconsequential, they are dramatic at the end of the period and display a pronounced curvilinear pattern. The highest level of constraint occurs in the 1970 cohort, which was just coming of age when the new party difference emerged.
(3) It is the interaction of life cycle, developmental process and a new political environment that?eventually?produces a distinctive "70s generation."
In this simulation the party difference emerges in 1970 and is stable subsequently. Nevertheless, the population continues to polarize on the issues for three reasons.
First, the operation of developmental processes, as people slowly adjust to the new political reality by modifying their issue attitudes and/or partisan affiliations.
Second, it reflects the process of population replacement in that new entrants to the polity evidence more constraint than do those who are exiting.
Third, and most interestingly, the heightened polarization reflects the interaction between generation formation and developmental processes. At first, new entrants look hardly more polarized than those exiting. But the polity is losing people who do not develop and is replacing them with people who do develop as they age. As a result, the population replacement engine produces effects that are increasingly felt as the developmental process plays itself out. Overall, partisan polarization in the 2000 electorate is the consequence of an event taking place thirty years earlier, an event whose full effects will not be felt until well after the pre-1970s cohorts are fully replaced.
(3) In the final simulation, the party difference is modeled as emerging in 1970 and then continuing to expand. The patterns found in this case (Table 5) are similar to those seen in table 4, with four significant differences.
First, constraint grows more rapidly over time within each cohort.
Second, constraint develops even more quickly for new cohorts facing a highly polarized partisan environment than for those facing a moderately polarized partisan environment, producing cohort differences not seen in Table 4.
Third, and as a consequence, enhanced cross-sectional cohort differences appear, especially as time passes.
Finally, the overall partisan polarization level grows at a faster rate than seen in the previous simulation, and by 2000 is larger.
The Rise of Partisan Polarization in the Electorate
*Table 7 contains the results.Results demonstrate that individuals develop greater consistency between their partisan affiliation and their issue commitment as they age, with the greatest gains usually coming in early adulthood. They also suggest that party differences on these longstanding issues have been growing, in contrast to the steady state modeled in simulation one.
Race and gender issues: The pattern changes where party divergence came in the 1960s and early 1970s (second panel of Table 7). As with our second and third simulations, cohort differences are initially minimal, as the 1972-1976 column shows, but eventually become pronounced and assume a curvilinear shape.
Patterning for these issues is similar to that found for the New Deal issues.
First, constraint gains are typically highest in early adulthood.
Second, each succeeding cohort is entering the electorate with a closer alignment between their party affiliation and their views on race and gender issues. As a consequence, by the last surveys the younger cohorts look very much like those who preceded them, save for the oldest cohort.
Results more striking for cultural issues index.
(1) Constraint levels begin at near zero in 1972-1976 for all cohorts. They climb steadily across the period, but especially for the cohort coming of age in the mid-1970s. The older cohorts lag behind; they have too much political experience from another era. The younger cohorts lag behind; they have not yet developed crystallized partisan or other political attitudes.
(2) Initial cohort differences: Each succeeding cohort entering the electorate shows higher constraint levels than the proceeding one. The partisanship of Americans socialized before the 1960s, has been, and remains, primarily tied to their positions on New Deal issues that have long divided the parties. The results for the youngest cohort are especially striking in the prominence of cultural issues, where the coefficient nearly matches that found for the New Deal issues.
The "new" issues involving race, gender, and culture, taken together, are becoming ever more important over time and across generation without supplanting traditional issue concerns.
As new entrants face a political environment where the partisan differences are not only evident on more issues but are also becoming clearer, partisan affiliations become increasingly aligned with a diverse set of issue commitments. Simultaneously, the power of cultural issues in defining Americans' partisanship is beginning to outweigh that of issues concerning race and gender.
In the 1970s and 1980s opinions on cultural issues were mostly disconnected from partisan affiliations, though attitudes about race and gender were seemingly influential. By the late 1980s and especially in the past decade, the pattern has reversed.
For each cohort save one the connection between cultural issues has grown stronger and has come to outstrip the connection based on race and gender issues.
Cultural issues in the electorate can only be expected to exacerbate the partisan cleavage, especially as new impressionable generations enter the electorate replacing those for whom cultural issues have little bearing on their partisan affiliations.
Conclusion:
The study of general age-related political maturations processes, life-cycle events and secular movements is important for what it reveals about individuals and the political system. The American electorate will reflect changes in political parties, but it may take some time before these changes emerge. Those who come of age when new party division emerge will be the strongest among all age groups. If party differences become increasingly accentuated over time, the "constraint" levels of young adults will match or exceed those of their politically experienced elders.
The general public has adopted elite-level partisan cleavages over time, but there isn't a simple explanation for this phenomenon. Over the past 30-40 years, there has been an interaction effect among (1) generational replacement of those less polarized by those more polarized, (2) increased polarization at the individual level over time and (3) by the conjunction of these mechanisms as the population became increasingly composed of cohorts that entered the electorate in the wake of new party divisions.
Put differently, "Beneath the clear over-time growth in ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate is a dynamic process that varies across time, across issues, and across generations" (Jennings & Stoker, 2008, 24).
There is a historical explanation for the emergence of partisan polarization in the electorate, and for the prominent variation across cohorts as of 1996-2004.
Implications:
Partisan polarization likely to increase (issues: race, gender and cultural matters). Americans' opinions strongly linked with Party ID. This isn't likely to change.
Research Opportunities:
(1) What cues are the public receiving about party differences? Origin of cues?
(2) Does the simple top-down representation of the elite-mass influence process miss dynamics working the other way?
(3) More complete explanations (e.g. political awareness and engagement) for how people develop over the life cycle (other than aging).
(4) Causal mechanisms: Is party ID shaping issue commitments? This would signal partisan polarization and realignment. Or are issue commitments shaping party ID? How does the strength of pre-adult socialization moderate causal dynamics? How do influence flows vary by age? Across generations?
(5) Generalizability across polities?How well does our model (and dynamics we have developed) apply to the party contexts outside of the US? Will be contingent on character, stability of political parties competing within a nation.
Jennings (2006) Gender Gaps in Attitudes and Beliefs
This study looks at attitudes about women's societal role within generations as they age and across generations.
Two variants of the gap:
(1) Longitudinal: The difference in support between men and women across generations at different points in time (focuses on change overtime across generations).
(2) Contemporaneous: The difference in support between men and women at a given time (looks at changes within generations over time).
The three samples:
(1) pre-movement
(2) during the movement
(3) post-movement
This study adds much to other studies that look at the gender gap, but do not consider longitudinal samples or multiple generations:
(1) replicated and multiple indicators or relevant attitudes within the same surveys
(2) developments across the life span
(3) multiple generations coming of age in discrete historical eras
(4) observations of pre-adults
Indicators of attitudes of attitudes about the political role of women:
(1) opinions about women;s place in the home v the public sphere
(2) support for the women;s movement
(3) beliefs about the current influence of women and men in public life
Three possible perspectives on the direction and magnitude of gender gaps across time and over generations:
(1) generation effects
-which can result from compositional differences across gens.
-or from birth cohorts which experience different political histories (which would be the generational-units that mannheim talks about).
(2) period effects
-reflect the impact of events and movements in the external world.
-fall more or less equully on all politically aware segments of the population; but period effects fall more heavily on the young, who are more impressionable than the resistant old. "In terms of the present analysis, period effects would be implicated if we fin that individuals from separate generations are moving in the same direction with respect to a belief in gender equality" (195). Do period effects fall equally on men and women?
(3) life-cycle effects
-as one ages certain beliefs become more tamped down or exacerbated, across genernations; i.e. people get more conservative as they age, CW. (see Sears 1990 for a study looking at whether attitudes become more resistant to change as individuals age).
METHODS
bla bla
FINDINGS:
-support for equal role of women in society:
*the increase is support is higher among women than men
*gen 1 women (43-59)= 17%; gen 3 women (23ish) = 74% (57% increase)
*1997 survey of men who grew up during the movement and their sons (post-movement) = fathers 8% more supportive. "Thus in contrast to women, with a more or less stead incrase or sustain suport across generations and time, support among men receded in the post-movement generation.." (200).
Two variants of the gap:
(1) Longitudinal: The difference in support between men and women across generations at different points in time (focuses on change overtime across generations).
(2) Contemporaneous: The difference in support between men and women at a given time (looks at changes within generations over time).
The three samples:
(1) pre-movement
(2) during the movement
(3) post-movement
This study adds much to other studies that look at the gender gap, but do not consider longitudinal samples or multiple generations:
(1) replicated and multiple indicators or relevant attitudes within the same surveys
(2) developments across the life span
(3) multiple generations coming of age in discrete historical eras
(4) observations of pre-adults
Indicators of attitudes of attitudes about the political role of women:
(1) opinions about women;s place in the home v the public sphere
(2) support for the women;s movement
(3) beliefs about the current influence of women and men in public life
Three possible perspectives on the direction and magnitude of gender gaps across time and over generations:
(1) generation effects
-which can result from compositional differences across gens.
-or from birth cohorts which experience different political histories (which would be the generational-units that mannheim talks about).
(2) period effects
-reflect the impact of events and movements in the external world.
-fall more or less equully on all politically aware segments of the population; but period effects fall more heavily on the young, who are more impressionable than the resistant old. "In terms of the present analysis, period effects would be implicated if we fin that individuals from separate generations are moving in the same direction with respect to a belief in gender equality" (195). Do period effects fall equally on men and women?
(3) life-cycle effects
-as one ages certain beliefs become more tamped down or exacerbated, across genernations; i.e. people get more conservative as they age, CW. (see Sears 1990 for a study looking at whether attitudes become more resistant to change as individuals age).
METHODS
bla bla
FINDINGS:
-support for equal role of women in society:
*the increase is support is higher among women than men
*gen 1 women (43-59)= 17%; gen 3 women (23ish) = 74% (57% increase)
*1997 survey of men who grew up during the movement and their sons (post-movement) = fathers 8% more supportive. "Thus in contrast to women, with a more or less stead incrase or sustain suport across generations and time, support among men receded in the post-movement generation.." (200).
Saturday, May 24, 2008
Mannheim (1972) The Problem of Generations
Generations: membership is based upon consciousness belonging to one generation. Unlike concrete groups (i.e. family, tribe, sect), membership of a generation is not deliberate. The ties between members of a generation have not resulted in a concrete group; "the unity of a generation is constitutied essentialy by a similarity of laction of a number of individuals within a social whole.
An additional component of generational membership is "participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit (118). For example, the peasants of Prussia and young people in China share a potential capability for being sucked into the vortex of social change, yet does not necessarily mean they will equailly take part or be exposed [is there a FURTHER distinction then in taking part and being exposed?].
Membership of a generation is important because "individuals who beolng to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, are endowed to that extent with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process" (105).
Understanding a generation as a "social location"
"The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process and thereby limit them to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience and a characteristic type of historically relevant action" (106).
Much like your class membership determine your access, it also determines your approach to material, the world, events, etc. For example, events affect everyone. Yet they affect everyone differently depending upon the timing of the event; the youngest politically aware generation during 9/11 and the oldest generation were socialized differently by 9/11. Whereas for older individuals the event either solidified or weakened PRIOR beliefs, for those most young the event was the primary socializing event they had yet encountered, and from there-on-out the way they view preceding events will be colored by their influential 9/11 experience. The same could be argued for those whom it was most salient for (those living in NY or those who lost someone) also look through a lens drastically colored by the tragedy. "The fact that people are born at the same time, or that their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve similarity of location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position to experience the same events and data, etc., and especially that these experiences impinge upon a similarly "stratified" consciousness" (112). "...mere contemporaneity becomes sociologically significant only when it also involved participation in the same historical and social circumstance" (113). This is why the same age groups of Chinese and Germans are necessarily socialized the same. "Early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set's verification and fulfillment or as its negation and antithesis" (113). "If we bear in mind that every concrete experience acquireds its particular face and form from its relation to the primary stratum of experiences from which all others receive their meaning, we can appreciate its importance for the further development of the human consciousness" (114).
The "polar" components of life shift, depending on the generation. All later experience recieve their meaning from the primary experiencetial stratum of earliest experiences of mankind.
----
Two ways in which the past is incorperated into the future:
(1) as consciously recoginized models on which men pattern their behavior (for example, revolutions after the French Revolution modeled themselves after the FR)
(2) as unconsciously condensed merely implicit or virtual patterns.
--------------
Two types of memories:
(1) appropriated (rake memories from someone else)
(2) personially acquired (personal memories, derived from experience): the knowledge gained from personally acquired memories is the only knowledge that "sticks" (111). "...one is old primarily insofar as he comes to live within a specific, individually acquired, framework of usable past experience, so that every new experience has its form and its place largely marked out for it in advance" (111). "In youth, on the other hand, FORMATIVE FORCES ARE JUST COMING INTO BEING, and basic atiudes in the process of development can take advantage of the molding power of new sitiations" (111).
SOCIAL REJUVENATION (112)
The only way to "start fresh" is by a new birth. "Their being young, the "freshness" of their contact with the work, manifest themlves in the fact that they are able to re-orient any movement they embrace, to adolt it to the total situation" (footnote 112).
Stratification of life experiences.
Teacher-pupil reciprocal relationship (116):
Older generations are able to absorb some of the younger generations' concerns; especially those old enough to relinquish their original approach.
-----
Generational units:
generational units represent a much more concrete bond than the actual generation as such. i.e. romantic-conservative youth v. liberation-rationalist youth of the same generation. "youth experiencing the same concrete historical problem may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways constitute separate generation-units" (120).
generational-units have a more binding tie on its members (122).
What produces generational units?
the Gestalt principle?
We always see things already formed in a special way; we think concepts defined in terms of a specific context. Form and context depend, in any case, on the group to which we belong. To become really assimilated into a group invovles more than mere acceptance of its characerist values--it in volves the ability to see things frm its particular "aspect" to endow concepts with its particular share of meaing, and it experience psychological and intellectual impulses in the configuation characteristic of the group. In means, futher, to absorb those interpretive formation principles which enable the individual to dea with new imporessions and events in a fashion broadlt predetermined by the group (122).
thus generational units can form based on the heighten participation in an event, where others in your generation lay low. End result? a number of generational-units making up one generation.
page 124...
An additional component of generational membership is "participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit (118). For example, the peasants of Prussia and young people in China share a potential capability for being sucked into the vortex of social change, yet does not necessarily mean they will equailly take part or be exposed [is there a FURTHER distinction then in taking part and being exposed?].
Membership of a generation is important because "individuals who beolng to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, are endowed to that extent with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process" (105).
Understanding a generation as a "social location"
"The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process and thereby limit them to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience and a characteristic type of historically relevant action" (106).
Much like your class membership determine your access, it also determines your approach to material, the world, events, etc. For example, events affect everyone. Yet they affect everyone differently depending upon the timing of the event; the youngest politically aware generation during 9/11 and the oldest generation were socialized differently by 9/11. Whereas for older individuals the event either solidified or weakened PRIOR beliefs, for those most young the event was the primary socializing event they had yet encountered, and from there-on-out the way they view preceding events will be colored by their influential 9/11 experience. The same could be argued for those whom it was most salient for (those living in NY or those who lost someone) also look through a lens drastically colored by the tragedy. "The fact that people are born at the same time, or that their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve similarity of location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position to experience the same events and data, etc., and especially that these experiences impinge upon a similarly "stratified" consciousness" (112). "...mere contemporaneity becomes sociologically significant only when it also involved participation in the same historical and social circumstance" (113). This is why the same age groups of Chinese and Germans are necessarily socialized the same. "Early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set's verification and fulfillment or as its negation and antithesis" (113). "If we bear in mind that every concrete experience acquireds its particular face and form from its relation to the primary stratum of experiences from which all others receive their meaning, we can appreciate its importance for the further development of the human consciousness" (114).
The "polar" components of life shift, depending on the generation. All later experience recieve their meaning from the primary experiencetial stratum of earliest experiences of mankind.
----
Two ways in which the past is incorperated into the future:
(1) as consciously recoginized models on which men pattern their behavior (for example, revolutions after the French Revolution modeled themselves after the FR)
(2) as unconsciously condensed merely implicit or virtual patterns.
--------------
Two types of memories:
(1) appropriated (rake memories from someone else)
(2) personially acquired (personal memories, derived from experience): the knowledge gained from personally acquired memories is the only knowledge that "sticks" (111). "...one is old primarily insofar as he comes to live within a specific, individually acquired, framework of usable past experience, so that every new experience has its form and its place largely marked out for it in advance" (111). "In youth, on the other hand, FORMATIVE FORCES ARE JUST COMING INTO BEING, and basic atiudes in the process of development can take advantage of the molding power of new sitiations" (111).
SOCIAL REJUVENATION (112)
The only way to "start fresh" is by a new birth. "Their being young, the "freshness" of their contact with the work, manifest themlves in the fact that they are able to re-orient any movement they embrace, to adolt it to the total situation" (footnote 112).
Stratification of life experiences.
Teacher-pupil reciprocal relationship (116):
Older generations are able to absorb some of the younger generations' concerns; especially those old enough to relinquish their original approach.
-----
Generational units:
generational units represent a much more concrete bond than the actual generation as such. i.e. romantic-conservative youth v. liberation-rationalist youth of the same generation. "youth experiencing the same concrete historical problem may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways constitute separate generation-units" (120).
generational-units have a more binding tie on its members (122).
What produces generational units?
the Gestalt principle?
We always see things already formed in a special way; we think concepts defined in terms of a specific context. Form and context depend, in any case, on the group to which we belong. To become really assimilated into a group invovles more than mere acceptance of its characerist values--it in volves the ability to see things frm its particular "aspect" to endow concepts with its particular share of meaing, and it experience psychological and intellectual impulses in the configuation characteristic of the group. In means, futher, to absorb those interpretive formation principles which enable the individual to dea with new imporessions and events in a fashion broadlt predetermined by the group (122).
thus generational units can form based on the heighten participation in an event, where others in your generation lay low. End result? a number of generational-units making up one generation.
page 124...
Friday, May 23, 2008
Campbell (2002) The Young and Realigning: A Test of the Socialization Theory of Realignment Theory
Abstract: Recent research has demonstrated that Democrats and Republicans are divided along religious line—religiously committed voters (Protestant and Catholic) identify as Republicans, while secularly oriented voters are more likely to be Democrats. This presents an excellent opportunity to test an implication of the Michigan model of party identification—that, in a realigning period, it is young voters who are more likely to reflect the new electoral cleavage. Using the Monitoring the Future archives of over 230,000 surveys administered to high school seniors from 1976-1996, I offer evidence that there is a sharp partisan divide defined by religious commitment among youth just on the cusp of obtaining the franchise. Furthermore, data from the NES (1980-98) confirm that the link between religiosity and Republican Party ID is stronger among younger than older voters.
Excellent opportunity to test Realignment Theory because there is a division—between religiously committed and secularly oriented voters. Are younger voters more likely to realign along religious versus secular lines—as literature on party identification and realignment suggests they should.
Realignment:
Observable changes in mass political behavior as the coalitions comprising the Republicans and Democrats shifts; there are periods in American history when the divisions between the parties are defined in a new way.
--Party ID
--Religion
Independent variables:
-party ID (choose your political preference—strong to weak democrat/republican)
-religious affiliation
-church attendance
-religious salience
-sociodemographic measures
The MTF measure?
--religiosity measure: (1) participation in religious community, (2) salience of religious beliefs
In the late 1970s, religiosity measures and correlation with the GOP is low… as the 1990s get along
Campbell (2002) The Young and Realigning: A Test of the Socialization Theory of Realignment Theory
Excellent opportunity to test Realignment Theory because there is a division—between religiously committed and secularly oriented voters. Are younger voters more likely to realign along religious versus secular lines—as literature on party identification and realignment suggests they should.
Realignment:
Observable changes in mass political behavior as the coalitions comprising the Republicans and Democrats shifts; there are periods in American history when the divisions between the parties are defined in a new way.
--Party ID
--Religion
Independent variables:
-party ID (choose your political preference—strong to weak democrat/republican)
-religious affiliation
-church attendance
-religious salience
-sociodemographic measures
The MTF measure?
--religiosity measure: (1) participation in religious community, (2) salience of religious beliefs
In the late 1970s, religiosity measures and correlation with the GOP is low… as the 1990s get along
Campbell (2002) The Young and Realigning: A Test of the Socialization Theory of Realignment Theory
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Ingelhart & Abramson (1994) Economic Security and Value Change
Abstract: Confirming Inglehart’s prediction (1971) of an intergenerational...
A theory of value change, from materialist values (economic and physical security) to post-materialist values (freedom, self-expression) on account of life-cycle effects or intergenerational change.
Life cycle effects: change in values as you age
Intergenerational change: change in values between younger generations and older generations on account of birthright.
Two hypotheses that predict changing values:
Socialization hypothesis: one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed in one’s pre-adult years.
Scarcity hypothesis: an individual’s priorities reflect one’s socioeconomic environment.
Short-term and Long-term value change:
Short-term value changes function like period effects; periods of prosperity lead to postmaterialism during the prosperity. Long-term value changes function like cohort effects; cohorts experience prosperity, develop values, and maintain those values, as a cohort.
Ingelhar's thesis predicts only model gains of about one point per year in post-materialism, since he argues that the trend is driven by generational replacement (long-term value change possible). If generational replacement were the only factor influencing value change, the trend toward postmaterialism would be similar in all these societies, since the speed of generational replacement varies only slightly from country to county.
yet the authors here provide additional evidence using cohort analysis and using two pieice of side information: (1) taking into consideration periods on economic ressession experienced by the countries, and (2) these economic conditions would result in a downward shift toward materialism.
findings:
The rise in the overall percentage difference index occurs because during these 22 yers the older, more materialistic cohorts were gradually dying and being replaced by younger, more postmaterialist cohorts. These results make clear that geernational replacement is a major force driving postmaterialism upward. in otherwards, gradually gains postmaterialism result mainly from the gradual exit of the older cohorts through death.
Yet short-term period effects are also present. In none of the 8 European societies none of them show a simple linear progression toward post-materialism.
Results show that materialist and non-materialist values wax and wane with economic prosperity (also predicted by Inglehart's theory); inflation and postmaterialist values move in tandem, as predicted.
A theory of value change, from materialist values (economic and physical security) to post-materialist values (freedom, self-expression) on account of life-cycle effects or intergenerational change.
Life cycle effects: change in values as you age
Intergenerational change: change in values between younger generations and older generations on account of birthright.
Two hypotheses that predict changing values:
Socialization hypothesis: one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed in one’s pre-adult years.
Scarcity hypothesis: an individual’s priorities reflect one’s socioeconomic environment.
Short-term and Long-term value change:
Short-term value changes function like period effects; periods of prosperity lead to postmaterialism during the prosperity. Long-term value changes function like cohort effects; cohorts experience prosperity, develop values, and maintain those values, as a cohort.
Ingelhar's thesis predicts only model gains of about one point per year in post-materialism, since he argues that the trend is driven by generational replacement (long-term value change possible). If generational replacement were the only factor influencing value change, the trend toward postmaterialism would be similar in all these societies, since the speed of generational replacement varies only slightly from country to county.
yet the authors here provide additional evidence using cohort analysis and using two pieice of side information: (1) taking into consideration periods on economic ressession experienced by the countries, and (2) these economic conditions would result in a downward shift toward materialism.
findings:
The rise in the overall percentage difference index occurs because during these 22 yers the older, more materialistic cohorts were gradually dying and being replaced by younger, more postmaterialist cohorts. These results make clear that geernational replacement is a major force driving postmaterialism upward. in otherwards, gradually gains postmaterialism result mainly from the gradual exit of the older cohorts through death.
Yet short-term period effects are also present. In none of the 8 European societies none of them show a simple linear progression toward post-materialism.
Results show that materialist and non-materialist values wax and wane with economic prosperity (also predicted by Inglehart's theory); inflation and postmaterialist values move in tandem, as predicted.
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Jennings (1983). Gender Roles and Inequalities in Political Participation: Results from an Eight-Nation Study
Explanations for why women are less politically active:
(1) Situational Explanation--contemportary characteristics of a womans life span.
(2) Structural--includes societal institutions (education, econom and laws deny women the same opps, benefits and protection that are accorded men)
(3) Socialization--it is taught--men are political animals and women are not.
This paper focuses on the third explanation; can disparities in political participation be traced back to practices within the family, practices which reflect societal norms about gender-appropriate behavior,
DATA:
1970s
Austria
Finland
Germany
Netherlands
GB
USA
Switzerland
Italy
Dep Var:
1 discussing politics with others
2 contacting public officials
3 working with others to solve community problems
4 signing petition
5 attending political rally or meeting
6 working for a candidate or party
7 convince another to vote
8 vote
Ind Var: Survey about family dynamics
communication paters and role prescriptions within the family
(1) Situational Explanation--contemportary characteristics of a womans life span.
(2) Structural--includes societal institutions (education, econom and laws deny women the same opps, benefits and protection that are accorded men)
(3) Socialization--it is taught--men are political animals and women are not.
This paper focuses on the third explanation; can disparities in political participation be traced back to practices within the family, practices which reflect societal norms about gender-appropriate behavior,
DATA:
1970s
Austria
Finland
Germany
Netherlands
GB
USA
Switzerland
Italy
Dep Var:
1 discussing politics with others
2 contacting public officials
3 working with others to solve community problems
4 signing petition
5 attending political rally or meeting
6 working for a candidate or party
7 convince another to vote
8 vote
Ind Var: Survey about family dynamics
communication paters and role prescriptions within the family
Flanagan etc al. (1998) Ties that Bind: COrrelates of Adolescents' CIvic Commitments in Seven Countries
Abstract: The relationship of voluntary work, school climates, and family values to public interest as a life goal of adolescents is presented for a sample of 5,579 12-18 year olds in three stable and found transitional democracies. If 5 of the 7 counties, females were more likely than makes to be engaged in voluntary work, and in all 7 countries girls were more likely than boys to report hat their families encouraged an ethic of social responsibility. Regardless of gender or country, adolescents were more likely to consider public interest and important life goal when their families emphasized an ethic of social responsibility. In addition, engagement volunteer work and a sense of student solidarity at school were formative components of public interest as a life goal for youth in some but not all countries.
Country Sample:
Australia
USA
Sweden
Hungary
Czech Repub
Bulgaria
Russia
Methods
500 kids 12 -18 from each country
survey administered
Dep Var: Civic commitment
measurement: 2 indicators
Ind Vars:
VOluntary work
family ethic of social responsibility
school climates: democratic climate and a sense of membership at school
FIndings:
engagement in voluntary work and student solidarity at school are factors related to an adolescent's identification with the public interest; societies that emphasize social responsibilty as a norm of citizenship are more likely to encourage a democratic polity.
Country Sample:
Australia
USA
Sweden
Hungary
Czech Repub
Bulgaria
Russia
Methods
500 kids 12 -18 from each country
survey administered
Dep Var: Civic commitment
measurement: 2 indicators
Ind Vars:
VOluntary work
family ethic of social responsibility
school climates: democratic climate and a sense of membership at school
FIndings:
engagement in voluntary work and student solidarity at school are factors related to an adolescent's identification with the public interest; societies that emphasize social responsibilty as a norm of citizenship are more likely to encourage a democratic polity.
Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) Leading by Example: Female members of Parliament as Political Role Models
Q: Does descripive representation matter? Just the presence of women in government has been linked to psychological engagement... this article aims to link it to political activity.
The Role Model Effect: role models inspire the young.
the logic...
"The expectation that political attitudes and behaviors might be most open to influence and a young age is supported by research throughout the world which suggests that political activity is habit forming..." (924).
"others suggest that the attitudes and actions of the young are more malleable and susceptible to cues than are those of citizens who have established political habits" (924)
[is this really that strong of an explanation for the gender gap??]
"Specifically, we ask whether cross national the presence of women in political office has an impact on the political activity of women" (922).
Sample:
14 year olds; fully democrat countries only (Freedom House Index measure)
Dep Vars:
(1) political discussion
(2) political activity (petition signing, boycotting, demonstrating, contacting volunteering, wearing campaign prop)
Ind Vars:
(1) presence of female political role models
(2) a number of demographic and control vars that consider family dynamics
Data:
EVS
ESS
CES
The Role Model Effect: role models inspire the young.
the logic...
"The expectation that political attitudes and behaviors might be most open to influence and a young age is supported by research throughout the world which suggests that political activity is habit forming..." (924).
"others suggest that the attitudes and actions of the young are more malleable and susceptible to cues than are those of citizens who have established political habits" (924)
[is this really that strong of an explanation for the gender gap??]
"Specifically, we ask whether cross national the presence of women in political office has an impact on the political activity of women" (922).
Sample:
14 year olds; fully democrat countries only (Freedom House Index measure)
Dep Vars:
(1) political discussion
(2) political activity (petition signing, boycotting, demonstrating, contacting volunteering, wearing campaign prop)
Ind Vars:
(1) presence of female political role models
(2) a number of demographic and control vars that consider family dynamics
Data:
EVS
ESS
CES
Friday, May 16, 2008
Westholm & Niemi (1992) Political Institutions and Political Socialization
The authors are looking at the difference between Party Id/partisanship and ideology (left/right) with regards to which is transmitted from parent to child; yet contrary to other scholars, the authors conceptualize the two variables in a single model.
Partisanship plays a special part in value transmission across generations. This is based on three tenets:
(1) Party ID is shaped earlier than other political attitudes (due to strong influence by mom and dad)
(2) Party ID is stable over time
(3) Party ID strongly affects other political attitudes
Yet a number of comparative findings reject partisanship transmission from parent to child (Thomassen, Dutch; Clark et al, Canada; Eijk and Niemoller, Netherlands; Converse and Dupeux, France)
In addition, a number of American political science studies also reject the transmission (Fiorina et a.l).
To better understand the transmission of partisanship (and ideology) from parent to child, Westholm and Niemi divide countries up based on stability of the democratic system to test whether this affects the transmission, and strength of transmission, from parent to child.
Authors' hypotheses:
H1 there is a more direct transfer of partisanship than of ideological orientation (direct meaning parent partisanship to chid partisanship, parent ideology to child ideology)
H2 cue taking is stronger from partisanship than ideological orientation
H3 indirect mechanisms will be more important to parent offspring similarity of ideological orientations than to similarity of partisanship (indirect meaning partisanship leads to ideology etc, ideology leads to partisanship, or effects are mediated by one or more intervening variable etc.)
H4 the direct transfer of partisanship will increase with the stability of the party system
H5 the strength of the indirect transfer routes relatively and absolutely, will increase with the strength of the associaion between ideological orientation and partisanship
H6 The direct transfer of left/right ideological orientations will be stronger in natons with multiparty systems
H7 the relationship between left/right orientation and partisanship will be stronger in nations with multiparty systems
H8 The indirect transfer of left/right ideological orientations will be stronger in nations with stable multiparty systems
H9 due to the strength of direct as well as indirect transfer, left/right ideological orientation will be most effectively transmitted in nations having a stable, multiparty system
Categorizing based on--
Degree of system stability:
(1) stable (US, GB, FInland, Sweden)
(2) relevatively stable (since WWII) (Austria, West Germany)
(3) turnmoil since WWII (Netherlands, France)
FIndings:
The strength of partisanship trends follows this classification quite well , supporting hypothesis 4 (the direct transfer of partisanship will increase with the stability of the party system).
hyothesis 1 is supported; partisanship transfer is higher than ideological.
hypothesis 5 is supported; the strength of the indirect route increased with the strength f the association between ideology and partisanship.
hypthosis 7 is supported; the relationship between ideology ad partisanship (within generations) is stronger in multiparty nations.
hypothesis 6 is also supported; ideological transmission is stronger in multiparty systems
hyothesis 8 is supported; indirect transmission of ideology is stronger in stable multiparty systems
hypothesis 9 is also supported give the results of 8.
Conclusion:
institutional conditions and historical events mediate direct and indirect transfers of partisanship and ideology from parents to child.
the strength of these inter- and intragenerational links appears in turn to be related to the stability and multiplicity, respectively, of the party system, also.
Partisanship plays a special part in value transmission across generations. This is based on three tenets:
(1) Party ID is shaped earlier than other political attitudes (due to strong influence by mom and dad)
(2) Party ID is stable over time
(3) Party ID strongly affects other political attitudes
Yet a number of comparative findings reject partisanship transmission from parent to child (Thomassen, Dutch; Clark et al, Canada; Eijk and Niemoller, Netherlands; Converse and Dupeux, France)
In addition, a number of American political science studies also reject the transmission (Fiorina et a.l).
To better understand the transmission of partisanship (and ideology) from parent to child, Westholm and Niemi divide countries up based on stability of the democratic system to test whether this affects the transmission, and strength of transmission, from parent to child.
Authors' hypotheses:
H1 there is a more direct transfer of partisanship than of ideological orientation (direct meaning parent partisanship to chid partisanship, parent ideology to child ideology)
H2 cue taking is stronger from partisanship than ideological orientation
H3 indirect mechanisms will be more important to parent offspring similarity of ideological orientations than to similarity of partisanship (indirect meaning partisanship leads to ideology etc, ideology leads to partisanship, or effects are mediated by one or more intervening variable etc.)
H4 the direct transfer of partisanship will increase with the stability of the party system
H5 the strength of the indirect transfer routes relatively and absolutely, will increase with the strength of the associaion between ideological orientation and partisanship
H6 The direct transfer of left/right ideological orientations will be stronger in natons with multiparty systems
H7 the relationship between left/right orientation and partisanship will be stronger in nations with multiparty systems
H8 The indirect transfer of left/right ideological orientations will be stronger in nations with stable multiparty systems
H9 due to the strength of direct as well as indirect transfer, left/right ideological orientation will be most effectively transmitted in nations having a stable, multiparty system
Categorizing based on--
Degree of system stability:
(1) stable (US, GB, FInland, Sweden)
(2) relevatively stable (since WWII) (Austria, West Germany)
(3) turnmoil since WWII (Netherlands, France)
FIndings:
The strength of partisanship trends follows this classification quite well , supporting hypothesis 4 (the direct transfer of partisanship will increase with the stability of the party system).
hyothesis 1 is supported; partisanship transfer is higher than ideological.
hypothesis 5 is supported; the strength of the indirect route increased with the strength f the association between ideology and partisanship.
hypthosis 7 is supported; the relationship between ideology ad partisanship (within generations) is stronger in multiparty nations.
hypothesis 6 is also supported; ideological transmission is stronger in multiparty systems
hyothesis 8 is supported; indirect transmission of ideology is stronger in stable multiparty systems
hypothesis 9 is also supported give the results of 8.
Conclusion:
institutional conditions and historical events mediate direct and indirect transfers of partisanship and ideology from parents to child.
the strength of these inter- and intragenerational links appears in turn to be related to the stability and multiplicity, respectively, of the party system, also.
Saturday, May 10, 2008
Gimpel, Lay & Schuknecht (2003) Cultivating Democracy: Civic environments and Political Socialization
Becoming Political: Local Environments and Political Socialization Chapter 1
The Focus: The effects of local context on political socialization.
Town 1: Dundalk, Maryland
Rustbelt Northeast (like the bible belt, the limousine liberals, Starbucks republicans, MAC users, Dunkin Donuts Democrats)
"A place as distinctive as Dundalk aolso breads an distinctive politics. The population is working class white, hostile to diversity, baffled by sustained immigration in the wake of September 11, pro-union, pro-death penalty, not highly confident that it has a voice in government, generally unsure of the value of its opinion,s, and Democrat by identification but not strongly loyal to either party" (2).
Town 2: Potomac, Maryland
wealthy; racially homogenous; kids are held to high academic standards; many suffer from depression.
"These kids grow up to see government as highly responsive to what few demands their parents make...Students pick up political orientations from their parents...Churchill students express their opinions on virtually any topic, but their views usually are not deeply seated in a hurtful personal experience of threat or injustice" (3).
City 3: Baltimore, Maryland
Black; isolated, insular population; disruptive kids; poor students; low retention among young teachers
"People are political socialized by the information they receive. This information certainly varies over time, but it varies more regularly across space, as communities and their constituent parts structure the content an flow of politically relevant messages in distinctive ways" (7). [individual characteristics + and characteristics of the place you live].
The Framework presented in this book:
(1) children are raised within a specific structural context, a local social environment, that influences the political attitudes and values that they develop---this includes income education, race, political engagement (voter turnout), political leaning (Dem etc). (often an indirect impact on adolescent's political develpoment).
(2) social context-structures quality and flow of information; some are self-selected (neighborhood), yet are constrained (i.e. by your income, and thus which neighborhood you have the option of living in). Work setting, also exposed one to political opinions/information
(3) the direct impact of structural environmental factors is mediated through family and school relationships which are more immediate sources of causal influence on an individual's sense of efficacy, political knowledge, nationalistic sentiment, tolerance of diversity, and other dispositions germane to the political socialization process. "We do not argue that political attitudes and behaviors are completely structurally determined but rather that the range of individual freedom is restricted by the political and social aspects of the nurturing environment in the family and community" (10).
Although much work has been done to uncover which individual characteristics determine political attitudes and activity, politics does not occur in a vacuum. "Instead, cetain social context stimulate interest and mobilize pople for political action better than other [hence the importance of subcultures!]" (8). "non-self selected exposure" (8).
Dependent Variables:
(1) internal efficacy
(2) external efficacy
(3) opposition to diversity
(4) nationalistic feeling
(5) negativity toward local police
(6) support for clinton impeachment
(7) political discussion in the past week
(8) factual knowledge exam score
Independent Variables:
(1) social environment
(2) political environment
(3) media exposure
(4) demographics--gender, race etc
(5) family characteristics
(6) school experience
Chapter 2 Communities and Political Socialization
"Some might argue that social and political contexts do not matter in an era in which people can receive information directly from television or through the internet. Our suggestion is that messages conveyed through broadcast media are refracted through and transfromed by local agents of political socialization, including peers, paresnts and other family members, school authorities, religious authoritise, and local news media" (45).
Gimpel Chapter 2: Communities and Political Socialization
general finding: communities have an impact on political attitudes and behavior independent of the effects of individual characteristics like race, occupation, income, party, etc.
Community Characteristics:
ethnic/immigrant composition:
-percent of community that is of Asian ancestry
-percent African American
-percent Hispanic
-percent foreign born
community resources:
-median family income
-percentage with college degree
political characteristics:
-percent in Democratic Party
-voter turnout
etc.
dependent variables:
-frequency of political discussion
-level of factual political knowledge
-internal and external senses of political chauvinism
-attitudes toward the police and courts
-support for the clinton impeachment
first three categories showed relationships with ethnic diversity, knowledge, efficacy and political discussion (ex: communities with higher Asian populations tended to have high levels of discussion and knowledge)
-community resources didn't have much of an effect on knowledge, efficacy, or discussion
-partisan diversity had larger impact on political knowledge - structures pre-adult socialization heavily
-voter turnout greater associated with support for law enforcement
-ethnically "mixed" communities less tolerant of immigrants...?
-political environment most potent predictor of attitudes toward tolerance - two-party system = greater tolerance (as opposed to a community with homogeneous political attitudes, one-party)
Chapter 3: Racial Group Membership, Neighborhood Context, and Political Socialization
-evaluate individual racial or ethnic traits with community characteristics with a two-level model (HLM)
-major difference between white respondents and minority respondents was level of political discussion (lower for minorities)
-negative attitides toward law enforcement not as context dependent as other socialization indicators
-they basically spent the whole chapter trying to correlate race with their previous measures (knowledge, efficacy, etc...)
their conclusion:
-living within a coethnic enclave is not conducive to a positive socialization experience unless you are white.
The Focus: The effects of local context on political socialization.
Town 1: Dundalk, Maryland
Rustbelt Northeast (like the bible belt, the limousine liberals, Starbucks republicans, MAC users, Dunkin Donuts Democrats)
"A place as distinctive as Dundalk aolso breads an distinctive politics. The population is working class white, hostile to diversity, baffled by sustained immigration in the wake of September 11, pro-union, pro-death penalty, not highly confident that it has a voice in government, generally unsure of the value of its opinion,s, and Democrat by identification but not strongly loyal to either party" (2).
Town 2: Potomac, Maryland
wealthy; racially homogenous; kids are held to high academic standards; many suffer from depression.
"These kids grow up to see government as highly responsive to what few demands their parents make...Students pick up political orientations from their parents...Churchill students express their opinions on virtually any topic, but their views usually are not deeply seated in a hurtful personal experience of threat or injustice" (3).
City 3: Baltimore, Maryland
Black; isolated, insular population; disruptive kids; poor students; low retention among young teachers
"People are political socialized by the information they receive. This information certainly varies over time, but it varies more regularly across space, as communities and their constituent parts structure the content an flow of politically relevant messages in distinctive ways" (7). [individual characteristics + and characteristics of the place you live].
The Framework presented in this book:
(1) children are raised within a specific structural context, a local social environment, that influences the political attitudes and values that they develop---this includes income education, race, political engagement (voter turnout), political leaning (Dem etc). (often an indirect impact on adolescent's political develpoment).
(2) social context-structures quality and flow of information; some are self-selected (neighborhood), yet are constrained (i.e. by your income, and thus which neighborhood you have the option of living in). Work setting, also exposed one to political opinions/information
(3) the direct impact of structural environmental factors is mediated through family and school relationships which are more immediate sources of causal influence on an individual's sense of efficacy, political knowledge, nationalistic sentiment, tolerance of diversity, and other dispositions germane to the political socialization process. "We do not argue that political attitudes and behaviors are completely structurally determined but rather that the range of individual freedom is restricted by the political and social aspects of the nurturing environment in the family and community" (10).
Although much work has been done to uncover which individual characteristics determine political attitudes and activity, politics does not occur in a vacuum. "Instead, cetain social context stimulate interest and mobilize pople for political action better than other [hence the importance of subcultures!]" (8). "non-self selected exposure" (8).
Dependent Variables:
(1) internal efficacy
(2) external efficacy
(3) opposition to diversity
(4) nationalistic feeling
(5) negativity toward local police
(6) support for clinton impeachment
(7) political discussion in the past week
(8) factual knowledge exam score
Independent Variables:
(1) social environment
(2) political environment
(3) media exposure
(4) demographics--gender, race etc
(5) family characteristics
(6) school experience
Chapter 2 Communities and Political Socialization
"Some might argue that social and political contexts do not matter in an era in which people can receive information directly from television or through the internet. Our suggestion is that messages conveyed through broadcast media are refracted through and transfromed by local agents of political socialization, including peers, paresnts and other family members, school authorities, religious authoritise, and local news media" (45).
Gimpel Chapter 2: Communities and Political Socialization
general finding: communities have an impact on political attitudes and behavior independent of the effects of individual characteristics like race, occupation, income, party, etc.
Community Characteristics:
ethnic/immigrant composition:
-percent of community that is of Asian ancestry
-percent African American
-percent Hispanic
-percent foreign born
community resources:
-median family income
-percentage with college degree
political characteristics:
-percent in Democratic Party
-voter turnout
etc.
dependent variables:
-frequency of political discussion
-level of factual political knowledge
-internal and external senses of political chauvinism
-attitudes toward the police and courts
-support for the clinton impeachment
first three categories showed relationships with ethnic diversity, knowledge, efficacy and political discussion (ex: communities with higher Asian populations tended to have high levels of discussion and knowledge)
-community resources didn't have much of an effect on knowledge, efficacy, or discussion
-partisan diversity had larger impact on political knowledge - structures pre-adult socialization heavily
-voter turnout greater associated with support for law enforcement
-ethnically "mixed" communities less tolerant of immigrants...?
-political environment most potent predictor of attitudes toward tolerance - two-party system = greater tolerance (as opposed to a community with homogeneous political attitudes, one-party)
Chapter 3: Racial Group Membership, Neighborhood Context, and Political Socialization
-evaluate individual racial or ethnic traits with community characteristics with a two-level model (HLM)
-major difference between white respondents and minority respondents was level of political discussion (lower for minorities)
-negative attitides toward law enforcement not as context dependent as other socialization indicators
-they basically spent the whole chapter trying to correlate race with their previous measures (knowledge, efficacy, etc...)
their conclusion:
-living within a coethnic enclave is not conducive to a positive socialization experience unless you are white.
Litt (1970) Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination
educational systems indoctrinate students to be good citizens. But this indoctrination differs from society to society (within the US). how do different socio-economic communities affect indoctrination efforts? i.e. textbooks selected/attitudes and norms differ...
Litt, “Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination.”
Since political indoctrination is not uniform, the author aims at examining the factors influencing political indoctrination.
Sample: Youths from secondary schools in each of three communities in Boston with different socioeconomic and political characteristics.
- Alpha == upper-middle class, high political activities
- Beta == lower middle-class, moderate political activities
- Gamma == working-class, little political activities
Method
- Content analysis of all textbooks used in the civic education program (5 dimensions: emphasis on citizen political participation, political chauvinism, democratic creed, emphasis on political process, and emphasis on politics as the resolution of group conflict).
- Interviews of school administrators and teachers of civic education, and community leaders.
- Questionnaire administered on children before and after taking civic education courses, with a control group.
Findings
- Textbooks: no difference in terms of democratic creed, political chauvinism. Gamma texts had fewer references to norms supporting political participation, and political process. Both Beta and Gamma texts had less emphasis on politics as the resolution of group conflict.
- Community norms: reinforce democratic creed, avoid chauvinism, encourage political participation. Alpha community more supportive to themes of politics as process, power, and of politics as group conflict.
- Changes in political attitudes after taking a civic course: children in the civic education more likely to endorse democratic creed and less likely to hold chauvinistic sentiments than those who did not take a course. But, the exposure to the class did not affect the attitudes toward political participation when compared to a control group. Only children in Alpha community strengthened their perceptions on politics as process of power and politics as the resolution of group conflict.
Conclusions
- Materials, support, and affect differed across three communities. Students in three communities are being trained to play different political roles and respond to political phenomena in different ways. For working-class community, civic education offers training for the basic democratic procedures, no stress on political participation. Lower middle-class community adds emphasis on the responsibilities of citizenship, not political decision-making. Affluent and politically active community provides children with insights to political process, functions of politics, and dynamics of decision-making.
Litt, “Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination.”
Since political indoctrination is not uniform, the author aims at examining the factors influencing political indoctrination.
Sample: Youths from secondary schools in each of three communities in Boston with different socioeconomic and political characteristics.
- Alpha == upper-middle class, high political activities
- Beta == lower middle-class, moderate political activities
- Gamma == working-class, little political activities
Method
- Content analysis of all textbooks used in the civic education program (5 dimensions: emphasis on citizen political participation, political chauvinism, democratic creed, emphasis on political process, and emphasis on politics as the resolution of group conflict).
- Interviews of school administrators and teachers of civic education, and community leaders.
- Questionnaire administered on children before and after taking civic education courses, with a control group.
Findings
- Textbooks: no difference in terms of democratic creed, political chauvinism. Gamma texts had fewer references to norms supporting political participation, and political process. Both Beta and Gamma texts had less emphasis on politics as the resolution of group conflict.
- Community norms: reinforce democratic creed, avoid chauvinism, encourage political participation. Alpha community more supportive to themes of politics as process, power, and of politics as group conflict.
- Changes in political attitudes after taking a civic course: children in the civic education more likely to endorse democratic creed and less likely to hold chauvinistic sentiments than those who did not take a course. But, the exposure to the class did not affect the attitudes toward political participation when compared to a control group. Only children in Alpha community strengthened their perceptions on politics as process of power and politics as the resolution of group conflict.
Conclusions
- Materials, support, and affect differed across three communities. Students in three communities are being trained to play different political roles and respond to political phenomena in different ways. For working-class community, civic education offers training for the basic democratic procedures, no stress on political participation. Lower middle-class community adds emphasis on the responsibilities of citizenship, not political decision-making. Affluent and politically active community provides children with insights to political process, functions of politics, and dynamics of decision-making.
Friday, May 9, 2008
Jaros, Hirsch, & Eleron Jr. (1970) The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture
building patriotic citizens in schools? Are these findings in fact, "culturally bound?"
2 problems:
(1) data is all from the U.S. (and white kids)
(2) the findings have not progressed that far
This chapter looks to see if the "benevolent leader" findings transmit to a sub-culture in the US: the Appalachian region of eastern KY; which works bc it is poor, rural, isolated
Two (2) explanations of Children's Authority Orientations:
(1) the family directly transmits positive values about government and political to the child while shielding him from stimuli which have negative connotations...
(2) the fam is an important socializing agent bc the child's experiences with his immediate authority figures (parents) are somehow projected to include more remote agencies, including the political.
Method:
N=2,432
kinds grade 5-12
paper and pencil questionnaires
Measuring affect for political authority:
(1) reports of images of president
(2) political cynicism score--basic orientation toward political actors and activity
Measurement of family authority structure:
(1 )father image
(2) noting whether the father lives at home
Findings:
the subculture has more negative attitudes toward government (571) and it doesnt change with age, unlike the other studies' findings.
Child views remain fairly static
Atypical findings from Knox support the notion of a direct transfer parental values to certain aspects of child political orientations—particularly re: political cynicism & competence of president
Doubt that family authority structure is an effective means of understanding political communication of regime values-look to other factors or other family dynamics
Explanatory relationships are modest
Positive views of political may be culturally bound
Divergent findings help underscore explanations for child political socialization
2 problems:
(1) data is all from the U.S. (and white kids)
(2) the findings have not progressed that far
This chapter looks to see if the "benevolent leader" findings transmit to a sub-culture in the US: the Appalachian region of eastern KY; which works bc it is poor, rural, isolated
Two (2) explanations of Children's Authority Orientations:
(1) the family directly transmits positive values about government and political to the child while shielding him from stimuli which have negative connotations...
(2) the fam is an important socializing agent bc the child's experiences with his immediate authority figures (parents) are somehow projected to include more remote agencies, including the political.
Method:
N=2,432
kinds grade 5-12
paper and pencil questionnaires
Measuring affect for political authority:
(1) reports of images of president
(2) political cynicism score--basic orientation toward political actors and activity
Measurement of family authority structure:
(1 )father image
(2) noting whether the father lives at home
Findings:
the subculture has more negative attitudes toward government (571) and it doesnt change with age, unlike the other studies' findings.
Child views remain fairly static
Atypical findings from Knox support the notion of a direct transfer parental values to certain aspects of child political orientations—particularly re: political cynicism & competence of president
Doubt that family authority structure is an effective means of understanding political communication of regime values-look to other factors or other family dynamics
Explanatory relationships are modest
Positive views of political may be culturally bound
Divergent findings help underscore explanations for child political socialization
Thursday, May 8, 2008
Conover & Searing (2000) A Political Socialization Perspective
STUDYING THE MAKING OF CITIZENS
The study of the development of "democratic character" among students is weak, and dated. What more, in practice schools' focus on developing democratic character in its students has also slowed--educators have re-centered their focus. This chapter aims to justify the educating of "democratic character" in the first place; determine what bars it; and better understand the social and psychological contexts of political socialization. The implications of this paper shouldeffect formal education, in the form of reform (i enjoy the word form).
at minimum, education should foster strong citizen identities, an understanding of citizens' roles, and hone skills necessary for this realization. (the role, btw, is as an actor, acting to sustain a representative, liberal democracy in a multicultural society). According to the authors, research has not focused on educations'/educators' role in this development. What more, the research has been overly focused on "practices" i.e. voting practices. instead of focusing on the "practices" the focus should be on patterns. The distinction is made here [when studying students]: "In the case of students, the question becomes are they developing lifelong patterns of political discussion, staying informed, and being tolerant in ways that can sustain a full practice of citizenship?" (93).
Other issues? researchers, typically, use determined definitions for topics, like "citizenship," instead of citizen defined definitions. The authors here are interested in the students' understanding of their role as citizens, and the extent to which their definition mirrors the socially prescribed role.
The authors here, thus, use an "interpretive model" (more comparative and more qualitative):
-more credible
-more explanatory
-less predictive
-developmental (recognizing that behavior is self-transformative over time; thus this research is sensitive to the ways in which practices of behaviors evolve over a lifetime) (93).
DATA:
US AND Great Britain (GB) school communities (4 types):
(1) suburban community
(2) rural community
(3) urban community
(4) immigrant community
Ind vars:
Sense of Citizenship:
"The key measurement task in determining the presense and centrality of citizens identities is to access whether this identity is apart of the core self, the pary of hte self easily accessible for frequent use" (98). Thus, students were asked "how often, if ever, do you think of yourself as a citizen of the US?" their answer to this question was compared to their answer to the question which substituted "student" "friend," "neighbor," "dem/republican" etc. for citizen.
-strength of citizen identity was highest for immigrants at 71.4%, than students in rural communities (60%), suburban (56%), followed by urban (55.7%). their level of identification for the other words was less strong (friend was strong). Thus students have core citizenship identities.
Question 1: Yet what is their understanding of citizenship? in all by the rural community (2), the meaning of a citizen was a person with rights and duties; for rural comms., the meaning of a citizen wasa member of the community, reflecting the tightknit social fabric of rural communities.
Distinguishing between citizen rights and citizen duties:
Students of each of the four communities were asked to rank:
(1) RIGHTS
civil, political and social
(2) DUTIES
political, communal, social, patriotic
Findings:
Although the communities differ, their is an obvious pattern across communities in their ranking of citizen RIGHTS. The only topic that saw considerable disagreement were topics where we see disagreements, in general--issues of homosexuality (the right to be homosexual) and abortion rights. Urban and Immigrant comms were opposed to both at much higher levels than rural and suburban communities (table on page 100).
citizen DUTIES were also consistent across populations, though the communal duties were ranked much higher by students from rural/farm communities. Also, the immigrant comm students stand out, in that these students stress the importance of social duties (see page 102 for full chart).
Question 2: To what extent are students developing the skills and motivation necessary to sustain regular political discussion?
measure (1) what issues do you talk about and how often [frequency] and (2) where [setting]?
FIndings:
schools, across all communities, are the setting for political discussions had by students (demonstrating the importance of schools in the development of citizens). Where there is considerable difference is in the frequency of discussion--students from immigrant comms rarely engage in political discussion, and neither do urban students; suburban and rural students at least engage in moderate levels of political discussion.
Question 3: How tolerant are students from each community?
Measure: ask students which group they disapprove of most (i.e. racists) and then ask them the number of tolerant acts they would commit toward this group. Urban and immigrant groups' tolerance toward the group they disapprove of most is very low; for sub and rural students, it is much higher (chart on page 107).
Question 4: To what extent does the educational experience help to ameliorate these deficiencies?
School experience broken down into four elements:
(1) the sense of school community
measure: identification with the school community and sense of shared interests.
(2) the students level of civic engagement
number of groups the student is associated with
(3) level of political discussion
asked how often they have serious discussion about political issues a. in school, b. at school, but not in class, c. after school, or d. with teachers (thus, a more concentrated assessment of the "setting" question, that just looks at the setting whilst at school).
(4) curriculum
asked if there are classes that influence their conception of citizenship, beyond american gov courses.
Findings:
(1) half of the students identify with their school--it is lowest among urban students (42%).
(2)sub and rural students are in more groups than urban and immigrant students
(3) political discussion takes place in class
(4) students talk about politics in english classes--though not at a high level or across all communities. it is based on contenentious efforts made by teachers, many of which do not conceive of this role.
Final and key question: To what extent do these four elements contribute to a sense and practice of citizenship?
Findings on page 113:
Civic engagment (membership in groups) is strongly correlated with a sense of citizenship, whereas political discussion, civic engagement, and discussion of politics in a non political class are correlated with a practice of citizenship.
Take home point?
social interaction in schools is key (i.e. group membership).
there is variation within schools (depending upon the teachers' efforts) and between communities
cannot reduce findings to differences in SES; the authors conclude that differences reflect subtle and not so subtle community differences in shared understanding of the meaning of citizenship, the importance of community, and goals of education, stressing the importance of a localized understanding of citizenship.
The study of the development of "democratic character" among students is weak, and dated. What more, in practice schools' focus on developing democratic character in its students has also slowed--educators have re-centered their focus. This chapter aims to justify the educating of "democratic character" in the first place; determine what bars it; and better understand the social and psychological contexts of political socialization. The implications of this paper shouldeffect formal education, in the form of reform (i enjoy the word form).
at minimum, education should foster strong citizen identities, an understanding of citizens' roles, and hone skills necessary for this realization. (the role, btw, is as an actor, acting to sustain a representative, liberal democracy in a multicultural society). According to the authors, research has not focused on educations'/educators' role in this development. What more, the research has been overly focused on "practices" i.e. voting practices. instead of focusing on the "practices" the focus should be on patterns. The distinction is made here [when studying students]: "In the case of students, the question becomes are they developing lifelong patterns of political discussion, staying informed, and being tolerant in ways that can sustain a full practice of citizenship?" (93).
Other issues? researchers, typically, use determined definitions for topics, like "citizenship," instead of citizen defined definitions. The authors here are interested in the students' understanding of their role as citizens, and the extent to which their definition mirrors the socially prescribed role.
The authors here, thus, use an "interpretive model" (more comparative and more qualitative):
-more credible
-more explanatory
-less predictive
-developmental (recognizing that behavior is self-transformative over time; thus this research is sensitive to the ways in which practices of behaviors evolve over a lifetime) (93).
DATA:
US AND Great Britain (GB) school communities (4 types):
(1) suburban community
(2) rural community
(3) urban community
(4) immigrant community
Ind vars:
Sense of Citizenship:
"The key measurement task in determining the presense and centrality of citizens identities is to access whether this identity is apart of the core self, the pary of hte self easily accessible for frequent use" (98). Thus, students were asked "how often, if ever, do you think of yourself as a citizen of the US?" their answer to this question was compared to their answer to the question which substituted "student" "friend," "neighbor," "dem/republican" etc. for citizen.
-strength of citizen identity was highest for immigrants at 71.4%, than students in rural communities (60%), suburban (56%), followed by urban (55.7%). their level of identification for the other words was less strong (friend was strong). Thus students have core citizenship identities.
Question 1: Yet what is their understanding of citizenship? in all by the rural community (2), the meaning of a citizen was a person with rights and duties; for rural comms., the meaning of a citizen wasa member of the community, reflecting the tightknit social fabric of rural communities.
Distinguishing between citizen rights and citizen duties:
Students of each of the four communities were asked to rank:
(1) RIGHTS
civil, political and social
(2) DUTIES
political, communal, social, patriotic
Findings:
Although the communities differ, their is an obvious pattern across communities in their ranking of citizen RIGHTS. The only topic that saw considerable disagreement were topics where we see disagreements, in general--issues of homosexuality (the right to be homosexual) and abortion rights. Urban and Immigrant comms were opposed to both at much higher levels than rural and suburban communities (table on page 100).
citizen DUTIES were also consistent across populations, though the communal duties were ranked much higher by students from rural/farm communities. Also, the immigrant comm students stand out, in that these students stress the importance of social duties (see page 102 for full chart).
Question 2: To what extent are students developing the skills and motivation necessary to sustain regular political discussion?
measure (1) what issues do you talk about and how often [frequency] and (2) where [setting]?
FIndings:
schools, across all communities, are the setting for political discussions had by students (demonstrating the importance of schools in the development of citizens). Where there is considerable difference is in the frequency of discussion--students from immigrant comms rarely engage in political discussion, and neither do urban students; suburban and rural students at least engage in moderate levels of political discussion.
Question 3: How tolerant are students from each community?
Measure: ask students which group they disapprove of most (i.e. racists) and then ask them the number of tolerant acts they would commit toward this group. Urban and immigrant groups' tolerance toward the group they disapprove of most is very low; for sub and rural students, it is much higher (chart on page 107).
Question 4: To what extent does the educational experience help to ameliorate these deficiencies?
School experience broken down into four elements:
(1) the sense of school community
measure: identification with the school community and sense of shared interests.
(2) the students level of civic engagement
number of groups the student is associated with
(3) level of political discussion
asked how often they have serious discussion about political issues a. in school, b. at school, but not in class, c. after school, or d. with teachers (thus, a more concentrated assessment of the "setting" question, that just looks at the setting whilst at school).
(4) curriculum
asked if there are classes that influence their conception of citizenship, beyond american gov courses.
Findings:
(1) half of the students identify with their school--it is lowest among urban students (42%).
(2)sub and rural students are in more groups than urban and immigrant students
(3) political discussion takes place in class
(4) students talk about politics in english classes--though not at a high level or across all communities. it is based on contenentious efforts made by teachers, many of which do not conceive of this role.
Final and key question: To what extent do these four elements contribute to a sense and practice of citizenship?
Findings on page 113:
Civic engagment (membership in groups) is strongly correlated with a sense of citizenship, whereas political discussion, civic engagement, and discussion of politics in a non political class are correlated with a practice of citizenship.
Take home point?
social interaction in schools is key (i.e. group membership).
there is variation within schools (depending upon the teachers' efforts) and between communities
cannot reduce findings to differences in SES; the authors conclude that differences reflect subtle and not so subtle community differences in shared understanding of the meaning of citizenship, the importance of community, and goals of education, stressing the importance of a localized understanding of citizenship.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Sigel. (1970). School Children's Reaction to the Death of a President.
Sigel, Roberta S. “An Exploration into Some Aspects of Political Socialization: School Children’s Reactions to the Death of a President.” Learning About Politics. 1970.
Sigel looks children’s reactions to the assassination of President Kennedy --assessing the nature & stability of their faith in political authority, attitudes towards authority figures, & understanding abstract concepts. She concludes that political socialization begins at an early stage in life—children @ younger ages were able to comprehend more than parents thought & were able to distinguish between the person of the president & the institution of the government. Political orientation had an impact of grief.
Idealized Image of President
Father-figure hypothesis—president is benevolent, competent, powerful; a source of personal identification for child
School learning—texts, books, teachers increase pride in president
American political culture—optimistic & trusting of presidency
Absence of personal observation—able to maintain idealized notion of president
Assumptions re: how child relates to the gov’t thru the president:
President’s death is a threat to child’s own security—incomplete socialization of child can’t separate president from gov’t as a whole
More the child identifies w/ the president as person who meets need, the more grief & worry child shows
Death of president alters child’s image of political authority as omnipotent
Death of president elicits feeling so grief, shock, horror
Feeling of hostility & anger toward perpetrator
The study looks at:
A comparison of children & adult reaction to assess socialization development & also a comparison across child ages
Children attitudes re: omnipotence /benevolence of political authority
Child understanding of abstract concepts—i.e. justice, due process, distinction between president & government institutions
Methods:
Written questionnaire to primary & secondary students; N=1349
Grades 4, 6, 8, 10, 12—with attempted representation of all social classes, & white & black students
Hess-Easton instrument—measures presidential competence, power of the president
National Opinion Research Center (NORC)—measures reaction to Kennedy’s assassination
Author constructed instrument—measure abstract concepts i.e. conception of presidency in relation to governmental structure, justice, due process, view of Ruby/Oswald affair—also included open-ended answers
Results
Comparison of children & adult reaction
Emotional reactions are very similar
Political interpretations & reactions differ
Parents tend to underestimate extent to which children were affected
Most salient emotion across all ages was shock & disbelief; sadness was next
Younger children reacted emotionally similar to adults, but there was a decrease in similarity as children got older—increased age (teens) were less emotional
Children (especially younger ones) worried more than adults—greater dependency needs, more personally shaken when authority structure is shaken
Children less likely to see conspiratorial plots re: assassination (Cuba, Communists), suggests a lack of sophisticated knowledge, particularly among the younger students
Younger children were less likely to be upset that due process was obstructed w/ Oswald’s murder
Political Orientation--**you may have noticed pg 164 & 165 were missing from the reader—I believe dealing w/ the political orientation variables. Here are the bits I got from the reading.
Children oriented towards the Democratic party reported more emotional responses & feelings of aggression toward Oswald
African-American children more upset than white or Republican children
Partisanship is an important intervening variable in how children reacted to assassination
Presidential Images before & after Nov. 22
Before assassination: president seen as powerful, competent (Easton-Hess results), authors’ instrument shows some ability of children to be critical, but overall, an idealized notion of the president (although decreases sharply w/ age increase)
After: slight decrease in perception of presidential power; children express worry, but have faith in gov’t stability—shows ability to distinguish bwtn president & gov’t institutions
Sigel looks children’s reactions to the assassination of President Kennedy --assessing the nature & stability of their faith in political authority, attitudes towards authority figures, & understanding abstract concepts. She concludes that political socialization begins at an early stage in life—children @ younger ages were able to comprehend more than parents thought & were able to distinguish between the person of the president & the institution of the government. Political orientation had an impact of grief.
Idealized Image of President
Father-figure hypothesis—president is benevolent, competent, powerful; a source of personal identification for child
School learning—texts, books, teachers increase pride in president
American political culture—optimistic & trusting of presidency
Absence of personal observation—able to maintain idealized notion of president
Assumptions re: how child relates to the gov’t thru the president:
President’s death is a threat to child’s own security—incomplete socialization of child can’t separate president from gov’t as a whole
More the child identifies w/ the president as person who meets need, the more grief & worry child shows
Death of president alters child’s image of political authority as omnipotent
Death of president elicits feeling so grief, shock, horror
Feeling of hostility & anger toward perpetrator
The study looks at:
A comparison of children & adult reaction to assess socialization development & also a comparison across child ages
Children attitudes re: omnipotence /benevolence of political authority
Child understanding of abstract concepts—i.e. justice, due process, distinction between president & government institutions
Methods:
Written questionnaire to primary & secondary students; N=1349
Grades 4, 6, 8, 10, 12—with attempted representation of all social classes, & white & black students
Hess-Easton instrument—measures presidential competence, power of the president
National Opinion Research Center (NORC)—measures reaction to Kennedy’s assassination
Author constructed instrument—measure abstract concepts i.e. conception of presidency in relation to governmental structure, justice, due process, view of Ruby/Oswald affair—also included open-ended answers
Results
Comparison of children & adult reaction
Emotional reactions are very similar
Political interpretations & reactions differ
Parents tend to underestimate extent to which children were affected
Most salient emotion across all ages was shock & disbelief; sadness was next
Younger children reacted emotionally similar to adults, but there was a decrease in similarity as children got older—increased age (teens) were less emotional
Children (especially younger ones) worried more than adults—greater dependency needs, more personally shaken when authority structure is shaken
Children less likely to see conspiratorial plots re: assassination (Cuba, Communists), suggests a lack of sophisticated knowledge, particularly among the younger students
Younger children were less likely to be upset that due process was obstructed w/ Oswald’s murder
Political Orientation--**you may have noticed pg 164 & 165 were missing from the reader—I believe dealing w/ the political orientation variables. Here are the bits I got from the reading.
Children oriented towards the Democratic party reported more emotional responses & feelings of aggression toward Oswald
African-American children more upset than white or Republican children
Partisanship is an important intervening variable in how children reacted to assassination
Presidential Images before & after Nov. 22
Before assassination: president seen as powerful, competent (Easton-Hess results), authors’ instrument shows some ability of children to be critical, but overall, an idealized notion of the president (although decreases sharply w/ age increase)
After: slight decrease in perception of presidential power; children express worry, but have faith in gov’t stability—shows ability to distinguish bwtn president & gov’t institutions
Jennings (1987) Residues of a movement
Jennings, M. Kent. (1987). Residues of a movement: The aging of the American protest generation. American Political Science Review, 81:2.
Study of the long-term effects of the protest era on those socialized within it. Compares students who did and did not protest and those who protested over time. There were some erosion effects, but the protest group was distinctive even after many years.
Generation: group that grows up at the same time ie the generation that grew up in the 60’s
Generation unit: subgroup of a generation that has some distinctive common experience (ie protesters in the 60’s)
Generational effects may produce social change over long periods. Compared to period effects and life cycle effects.
Absolute continuity: same attitude is constant over time (ie 50% of gen x votes consistently over lifetime)
Relative continuity: consistent differences between different generations over time (ie baby boomers always 20% more likely to vote than gen x over time)
Equivalent continuity: unique generational reaction to anew stimulus.
Reviews the sample for Jennings’ study
All ppl in this analysis are college grads, separated into protesters and non-protesters.
Protesters were somewhat different before college, but more different afterward.
Partisanship and Civil liberties: baptismal effects:
--Party: In 1965, future protesters were slightly more likely to be Democrats. In 1973, protesters became more Democratic and non-protesters became more associated with Independents. Little change between 1973 and 1982. trend at individual and aggregate level
--Voting: 13 point difference in support for Republican prez candidate in 1964, much greater differences in 1968 (25% vs 59%), which continued in ’72, ’76 and ’80. protesters changed little, stayed at low support. Non-protesters became more republican. trend at individual and aggregate level
-- civil liberties: protesters more tolerant of civil liberties, but all college grads scored fairly high. Absolute and relative continuity of protest generational unit.
-- school prayer: little diff between protesters and non in 1965, diverge in 1973, with protesters more opposed, and trend held in 1982.
--school integration: protesters more supportive in 1965, diverge further in ’73 and ’82. Little change for protesters, reduced support for non-protesters.
Group Interests and policy views: erosion effects
--support for conservative establishment: protesters became more warm to conservative groups, but so did non-protesters, so there is relative but not absolute continuity. Bigger difference in feeling toward conservatives than liberal groups. Protesters more warm, but by less, and with less change over time.
--over time reduction in feelings that disadvantaged groups have “too little power”, especially in the case of young people. Erosion for both protesters and non, so relative but not absolute continuity again, except for young people, where the two groups converged.
--Issue orientations: very different in 1973, with protesters more liberal. The groups became more similar in 1982, with protesters more conservative than they were in 1973, but still more liberal than non-protesters in 1982. erosion: little absolute continuity, some relative continuity, but less than for other variables. Protesters also more liberal on “new” issues of reducing health and human services resources and abortion.
-results not likely due to regression artifacts
-paradox of increasingly conservative baby boomers is no paradox at all because protesters are a minority of the population, and even they have become more conservative.
Study of the long-term effects of the protest era on those socialized within it. Compares students who did and did not protest and those who protested over time. There were some erosion effects, but the protest group was distinctive even after many years.
Generation: group that grows up at the same time ie the generation that grew up in the 60’s
Generation unit: subgroup of a generation that has some distinctive common experience (ie protesters in the 60’s)
Generational effects may produce social change over long periods. Compared to period effects and life cycle effects.
Absolute continuity: same attitude is constant over time (ie 50% of gen x votes consistently over lifetime)
Relative continuity: consistent differences between different generations over time (ie baby boomers always 20% more likely to vote than gen x over time)
Equivalent continuity: unique generational reaction to anew stimulus.
Reviews the sample for Jennings’ study
All ppl in this analysis are college grads, separated into protesters and non-protesters.
Protesters were somewhat different before college, but more different afterward.
Partisanship and Civil liberties: baptismal effects:
--Party: In 1965, future protesters were slightly more likely to be Democrats. In 1973, protesters became more Democratic and non-protesters became more associated with Independents. Little change between 1973 and 1982. trend at individual and aggregate level
--Voting: 13 point difference in support for Republican prez candidate in 1964, much greater differences in 1968 (25% vs 59%), which continued in ’72, ’76 and ’80. protesters changed little, stayed at low support. Non-protesters became more republican. trend at individual and aggregate level
-- civil liberties: protesters more tolerant of civil liberties, but all college grads scored fairly high. Absolute and relative continuity of protest generational unit.
-- school prayer: little diff between protesters and non in 1965, diverge in 1973, with protesters more opposed, and trend held in 1982.
--school integration: protesters more supportive in 1965, diverge further in ’73 and ’82. Little change for protesters, reduced support for non-protesters.
Group Interests and policy views: erosion effects
--support for conservative establishment: protesters became more warm to conservative groups, but so did non-protesters, so there is relative but not absolute continuity. Bigger difference in feeling toward conservatives than liberal groups. Protesters more warm, but by less, and with less change over time.
--over time reduction in feelings that disadvantaged groups have “too little power”, especially in the case of young people. Erosion for both protesters and non, so relative but not absolute continuity again, except for young people, where the two groups converged.
--Issue orientations: very different in 1973, with protesters more liberal. The groups became more similar in 1982, with protesters more conservative than they were in 1973, but still more liberal than non-protesters in 1982. erosion: little absolute continuity, some relative continuity, but less than for other variables. Protesters also more liberal on “new” issues of reducing health and human services resources and abortion.
-results not likely due to regression artifacts
-paradox of increasingly conservative baby boomers is no paradox at all because protesters are a minority of the population, and even they have become more conservative.
Sunday, May 4, 2008
Klatch (1999) A Generation Divided
INTRODUCTION
"The thrust of my research aims at analyzing the development and evolution of political ideology and the enduring impact of political commitment" (11).
We associate the 1960s with the civil rights movement, and a shift to the Left. No one ever talks about the New Right, yet the 60s were a time of ferment for the right as well as the left.
Groups of interest:
a. YAF (Young Americans for Freedom)
b. SDS (Student Democrat Society)
Sample:
74 YAF and SDS activists followed from their political awakenings to their involvement in the 1960s political activism, and BEYOND!
Questions the authors seek to answer:
(1) How did these kids get drawn into politics
(2) What happened to them once they became "political"
(3) How did activism shape their adult lives?
Mannheim's "The Problems of Generations"
---
-youth aged 17-25 are in a decisive period--their "natural view of the world" is being formed.
Mannheim recognizes that generations are formed when the same group of individuals experience the same thing--like a depression or a war. Yet, this does not coalesce the individuals into ONE group--different individuals experience the same event differently. "Variations in social background predispose people to interpret events differently" (3). These are described by Mannheim as antagonistic, or separate, generation-units. The author here characterizes it as "intragenerational conflict.
Unique to the 60s:
-extension of high educ. to more of the population
-growth of the nuclear age
-post-materialist values spreading
-spread of youth culture
--vietnam war
Related themes:
(1) Political Identity: what defines a person as a social actor (the author is concerned with individual level ident. not the collective--although obviously the collective identity is important, as the author notes).
(2) Gender--men and women experienced the 60s differently. and women within each group (YAF and SDS) perceived discrimination differently. Some women on the right felt men treated them well/poor, and same with women on the left.
(3) Convergence of Left and Right--those on the left and right are not entirely polar opposites. The emergence of libertarians is crucial. It was a hybrid movement, drawing from the left and right. . "This overlap between the left and the right speaks to the peculiarities of American political ideology. Specifically, an affinity for values such as individual freedom, the impulse against bureaucracy and big government, the questioning of central authority, and the embrace of decentralized and local control are common to both the left and the right" (9).
Methods:
I. Life Histories
-indepth interviews that focus on four sets of issues:
(1) demographics, religiosity family dynamics and socialization (of indivs and their parents)
(2) political involvement
(3) indivs interpretation of key events
(4) live since the 60s
II. Participant Observation
-author attended movement reunions of participants
III. Archival Materials
-YAF and SDS org material analysis
IV. Retrospective Memory
-memories. "memories illuminate how individuals shape and reshape their identities" (13).
*life history problems? the authors have a number of checks in place. see page 14.
CHAPTER 2-backgrounds
Conclusions: childhood matters! the conditions into which we are born, the families in which we are raises, and the values and beliefs that surround us play a role.
Similarities in backgrounds between the YAF and SDS are that their childhoods were atypical--parents were politically aware and engaged. Further, their parents encouraged their children to be the same. "Thus for the majority of these youth, their parents provided them with the framework and motivtion that gave shape to their identity as activists" (58).
Interestingly, there are stark differences is social backgrounds between members of the YAF and SDS; these differences are what caused them to react differently to the 1960s. The differences are that although both had politically active and aware parents, the values, community emphasis and religiosity tendencies the children were subject to, differ.
"The thrust of my research aims at analyzing the development and evolution of political ideology and the enduring impact of political commitment" (11).
We associate the 1960s with the civil rights movement, and a shift to the Left. No one ever talks about the New Right, yet the 60s were a time of ferment for the right as well as the left.
Groups of interest:
a. YAF (Young Americans for Freedom)
b. SDS (Student Democrat Society)
Sample:
74 YAF and SDS activists followed from their political awakenings to their involvement in the 1960s political activism, and BEYOND!
Questions the authors seek to answer:
(1) How did these kids get drawn into politics
(2) What happened to them once they became "political"
(3) How did activism shape their adult lives?
Mannheim's "The Problems of Generations"
---
-youth aged 17-25 are in a decisive period--their "natural view of the world" is being formed.
Mannheim recognizes that generations are formed when the same group of individuals experience the same thing--like a depression or a war. Yet, this does not coalesce the individuals into ONE group--different individuals experience the same event differently. "Variations in social background predispose people to interpret events differently" (3). These are described by Mannheim as antagonistic, or separate, generation-units. The author here characterizes it as "intragenerational conflict.
Unique to the 60s:
-extension of high educ. to more of the population
-growth of the nuclear age
-post-materialist values spreading
-spread of youth culture
--vietnam war
Related themes:
(1) Political Identity: what defines a person as a social actor (the author is concerned with individual level ident. not the collective--although obviously the collective identity is important, as the author notes).
(2) Gender--men and women experienced the 60s differently. and women within each group (YAF and SDS) perceived discrimination differently. Some women on the right felt men treated them well/poor, and same with women on the left.
(3) Convergence of Left and Right--those on the left and right are not entirely polar opposites. The emergence of libertarians is crucial. It was a hybrid movement, drawing from the left and right. . "This overlap between the left and the right speaks to the peculiarities of American political ideology. Specifically, an affinity for values such as individual freedom, the impulse against bureaucracy and big government, the questioning of central authority, and the embrace of decentralized and local control are common to both the left and the right" (9).
Methods:
I. Life Histories
-indepth interviews that focus on four sets of issues:
(1) demographics, religiosity family dynamics and socialization (of indivs and their parents)
(2) political involvement
(3) indivs interpretation of key events
(4) live since the 60s
II. Participant Observation
-author attended movement reunions of participants
III. Archival Materials
-YAF and SDS org material analysis
IV. Retrospective Memory
-memories. "memories illuminate how individuals shape and reshape their identities" (13).
*life history problems? the authors have a number of checks in place. see page 14.
CHAPTER 2-backgrounds
Conclusions: childhood matters! the conditions into which we are born, the families in which we are raises, and the values and beliefs that surround us play a role.
Similarities in backgrounds between the YAF and SDS are that their childhoods were atypical--parents were politically aware and engaged. Further, their parents encouraged their children to be the same. "Thus for the majority of these youth, their parents provided them with the framework and motivtion that gave shape to their identity as activists" (58).
Interestingly, there are stark differences is social backgrounds between members of the YAF and SDS; these differences are what caused them to react differently to the 1960s. The differences are that although both had politically active and aware parents, the values, community emphasis and religiosity tendencies the children were subject to, differ.
Thursday, May 1, 2008
Cole, Zucker & Ostrove (1999) Political Participation and Feminist Consciosness Among Women Activists of the 1960s
Abstract:
This paper examines the hypothesis that women who took part in student movements of the 1960s would be distinguishable from their contemporaries in terms of political ideology, political behavior, and feminism in the middle age. Women who had been identified as students activists in public records during the late 1960s and early 1970s were compared to a sample of nonactivist peers. Although the two groups scored similarly on variables related to work and family arrangements, former activits scored high on measures of leftist political orientation and political efficacy, reported greater political salience and collectivsm, and reported greater current political participation. Although both groups reported high levels of feminist consciousness and identity, activists scored significantly higher. The difficulty of politically mobilizing women to combat gender discrimination is discussed in light of the discrepancy between consciousness and activism in the comparison group.
This paper examines the hypothesis that women who took part in student movements of the 1960s would be distinguishable from their contemporaries in terms of political ideology, political behavior, and feminism in the middle age. Women who had been identified as students activists in public records during the late 1960s and early 1970s were compared to a sample of nonactivist peers. Although the two groups scored similarly on variables related to work and family arrangements, former activits scored high on measures of leftist political orientation and political efficacy, reported greater political salience and collectivsm, and reported greater current political participation. Although both groups reported high levels of feminist consciousness and identity, activists scored significantly higher. The difficulty of politically mobilizing women to combat gender discrimination is discussed in light of the discrepancy between consciousness and activism in the comparison group.
Hawkins, Pingree & Roberts (1975) Watergate and Political Socialization
What was the long term impact of the Watergate crisis on children?
Studies show that children as young as 8 begin to form political ideas (406).
studies assessing parents and schools as the main socializing agents have not panned out; there must be something else going on.
Why Watergate? Much more information was available; and for a long time. second, it was a tarnished picture of the political process. One that differs from what they are taught in school. Third, the affective judgments encouraged by the event--lying cheating etc--are the simple good/bad kind that are easy for children to make and understand. Fourth, the President is the focus... central to a child's conception of government.
Research Design
Naturally design experiment: Watergate
Questions:
(1) What did Watergate mean to children it terms of their communication behaviors, knowledge of the events, and attitudes about specific and general aspects of the political system?
(2) which children were most involved in and affected by the Watergate scandal?
Family Communication:
(1) socio-orientation: encourage the child to avoid controversy
(2) concept-orientation: encourage expression of ideas and exposure to controversy
Hypotheses:
children from c.o. families to have payed attention to w.g. but not to have made affective judgments
children from s.o. families to have payed less attention to w.g., but still affect attitudinal responses to affective issues in the w.g. events.
Method:
N=1,173 1972
4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 graders
Independent Variables:
Grade--older children = more comm and more knowledge
C.O. no diff
Party Preference no diff
S.O. by party no diff
Grade by Party Pref. no diff
Interest in Politics higher among older
Mean Use for Political Info more info consumption = more comm and more ken
Discussion of Politics high discourse = more communication
Dependent Variables:
Knowledge of W.G.
Communication about W.G.
Nixon's Involvement
Eval of Nixon
Findings:
Studies show that children as young as 8 begin to form political ideas (406).
studies assessing parents and schools as the main socializing agents have not panned out; there must be something else going on.
Why Watergate? Much more information was available; and for a long time. second, it was a tarnished picture of the political process. One that differs from what they are taught in school. Third, the affective judgments encouraged by the event--lying cheating etc--are the simple good/bad kind that are easy for children to make and understand. Fourth, the President is the focus... central to a child's conception of government.
Research Design
Naturally design experiment: Watergate
Questions:
(1) What did Watergate mean to children it terms of their communication behaviors, knowledge of the events, and attitudes about specific and general aspects of the political system?
(2) which children were most involved in and affected by the Watergate scandal?
Family Communication:
(1) socio-orientation: encourage the child to avoid controversy
(2) concept-orientation: encourage expression of ideas and exposure to controversy
Hypotheses:
children from c.o. families to have payed attention to w.g. but not to have made affective judgments
children from s.o. families to have payed less attention to w.g., but still affect attitudinal responses to affective issues in the w.g. events.
Method:
N=1,173 1972
4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 graders
Independent Variables:
Grade--older children = more comm and more knowledge
C.O. no diff
Party Preference no diff
S.O. by party no diff
Grade by Party Pref. no diff
Interest in Politics higher among older
Mean Use for Political Info more info consumption = more comm and more ken
Discussion of Politics high discourse = more communication
Dependent Variables:
Knowledge of W.G.
Communication about W.G.
Nixon's Involvement
Eval of Nixon
Findings:
Sears & Valentino (1997) Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult Socialization
Abstract:
We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; (2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystalization. Adolescents (aged 10 to 17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispostions that persist into later life stages.
There are two positions:
(1) those scholars that hold that basic attitudes are susceptible to change (Downs 1957; Key 1966)
(2) scholars that hold attitudes are formed young, and persist into adulthood (Campbell 1960)
Thus there are considerable discrepencies about the origins and persistence of party identification. Yet "understanding the origins of Americans' party identification is of unquestioned importance for understanding voting behavior in the US" (2).
Three questions this article asks:
(1) Are preadult opinions meaningful? i.e. do preadult political opinions withstand time?
(2) Is there a point at which the attitude becomes fortified? i.e. the attitude is strong. Many have argued that attitudes captured in surveys are actually "non-attitudes" and oscilate with the question, mood, and time of survey.
(3) What is the rate of persistence? Do we adjust our view, or is it stable?
When are attitudes crystalized? the crystalization of attitudes involves attitude stability. when do they go form nonattitudes to "real" attitudes? The authors suggest it is at times when crucial events provide an extensive information flow (i.e. presidential campaigns)
Implications for findings:
(1) politics matter, to adults and preadults
(2) political socialization will progress discontinuously overtime
(3) different attitudes are likely to have quite different growth curves
(4) generational effects should emerge on issues that become highly salient in one specific historical era.
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL EVENTS
prior political experience affects the effect of events; more fully socialized adults may be less effected by an event like the choice of our country to go to war. But preadults are likely to be less socialized than adults, and the authors hypothesize that a political events can help preadults close the gap. "Prior work on poltiical socialization suggests that preadults' precampaign attiudes are liekly to be high in expressed affect but based upon relatively little information and rather uncrystalized" (pg?).
Four state hypotheses:
H1 a pres campaign should generate preadult socialization gains in the attitude domains most centrl to the campaign, relative to precampaign baselines.
H2 preadults should show fewer socialization gains in the periods between presidential campaigns than duing campaigns
H3 during the campaign period, preadults should show fewer socialization gains in attitude domains either less salient or wholly peripheral to the campaign than in domains central to the campaign
H4 the campaign should help close the initial socialization gap between preadult and adults in domains central to the campaign. Yet it should not diminish preadult-adult gap in domains peripheral to the campaign, or in any domain during the post-campaign period.
Dep var:
socialization gains "expressed affect, information, and attitude crystallization. (measured using three dimensions of crystallization: (1) stability, (2) consistency and (3) the power of one attitude to determine other attitudes toward new or neutral objects).
Data:
three-wave panel studny of families from WI.
wave 1 N=718 parent-offspring pairs
wave 2 N = 501
wave 3 N = 366
Attitude domains: the president running and the political parties
Procedure:
effects of the campaign are assessed by comparing wave 1 with wave 2. if the campaign was a potent socializing event, then adolescents should show gains in the most central domains over the two waves. they should be less likely to show gains in the less salient domains between wave 2 and 3, conducted a year later. If there do happen to be gains in less salient or peripheral domains, they are from other sources, ie family socialization.
Measurement:
partisan affect strength:
(1) Candidate opinionation: like or dislike for candidate (carter, kennedy, reagan, bush)
(2) Candidate affect: intensity measure
(3) Party opinionation: evaluate party--4 questions
(4) Party affect: intensity of each eval.
partisan information measure:
(1) four factual questions regarding the candidates party affiliation
(2) ability to link party to corresponding symbols (14 of them)
(3) party-issue placement (4 specific issue questions)
crystalization measure:
most attention to the domains of insterest to campaign, and stability of attitudes of participations on these issues.
Findings:
Preadults
Affect (Wave 1, 2, 3)
(1) candidate opinionation (.83, .92, .95)
(2) intensity (2.02, 2.21, 2.29)
(3) party opinionation (.69, .79, .77)
(4) intensity (1.52, 1.73, 1.67)
Information
(1) candidates’ party (.49, .67, .66)
(2) party symbols (.39, .44, .50)
(3) party issue-placement (.41, .52, .64)
Attitude crystallization
(1) consistency of candidate evals (1.14, .97, .96)
(2) stability of candidate evals (1.02, .85, NA)
(3) consistency of party i.d. w candidate evals (1.55, 1.36, 1.27)
(4) consistency of party i.d. (.63, .67, .60)
Before election Preadults were partisan, but had little factual knowledge.
Preadult socialization gains during campaign: partisanship increased; party id became more crystallized; gained knowledge.
Preadult socialization after the campaign: measures of crystallization largely stops.
NO socialization gains in less salient domains.
We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; (2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystalization. Adolescents (aged 10 to 17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispostions that persist into later life stages.
There are two positions:
(1) those scholars that hold that basic attitudes are susceptible to change (Downs 1957; Key 1966)
(2) scholars that hold attitudes are formed young, and persist into adulthood (Campbell 1960)
Thus there are considerable discrepencies about the origins and persistence of party identification. Yet "understanding the origins of Americans' party identification is of unquestioned importance for understanding voting behavior in the US" (2).
Three questions this article asks:
(1) Are preadult opinions meaningful? i.e. do preadult political opinions withstand time?
(2) Is there a point at which the attitude becomes fortified? i.e. the attitude is strong. Many have argued that attitudes captured in surveys are actually "non-attitudes" and oscilate with the question, mood, and time of survey.
(3) What is the rate of persistence? Do we adjust our view, or is it stable?
When are attitudes crystalized? the crystalization of attitudes involves attitude stability. when do they go form nonattitudes to "real" attitudes? The authors suggest it is at times when crucial events provide an extensive information flow (i.e. presidential campaigns)
Implications for findings:
(1) politics matter, to adults and preadults
(2) political socialization will progress discontinuously overtime
(3) different attitudes are likely to have quite different growth curves
(4) generational effects should emerge on issues that become highly salient in one specific historical era.
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL EVENTS
prior political experience affects the effect of events; more fully socialized adults may be less effected by an event like the choice of our country to go to war. But preadults are likely to be less socialized than adults, and the authors hypothesize that a political events can help preadults close the gap. "Prior work on poltiical socialization suggests that preadults' precampaign attiudes are liekly to be high in expressed affect but based upon relatively little information and rather uncrystalized" (pg?).
Four state hypotheses:
H1 a pres campaign should generate preadult socialization gains in the attitude domains most centrl to the campaign, relative to precampaign baselines.
H2 preadults should show fewer socialization gains in the periods between presidential campaigns than duing campaigns
H3 during the campaign period, preadults should show fewer socialization gains in attitude domains either less salient or wholly peripheral to the campaign than in domains central to the campaign
H4 the campaign should help close the initial socialization gap between preadult and adults in domains central to the campaign. Yet it should not diminish preadult-adult gap in domains peripheral to the campaign, or in any domain during the post-campaign period.
Dep var:
socialization gains "expressed affect, information, and attitude crystallization. (measured using three dimensions of crystallization: (1) stability, (2) consistency and (3) the power of one attitude to determine other attitudes toward new or neutral objects).
Data:
three-wave panel studny of families from WI.
wave 1 N=718 parent-offspring pairs
wave 2 N = 501
wave 3 N = 366
Attitude domains: the president running and the political parties
Procedure:
effects of the campaign are assessed by comparing wave 1 with wave 2. if the campaign was a potent socializing event, then adolescents should show gains in the most central domains over the two waves. they should be less likely to show gains in the less salient domains between wave 2 and 3, conducted a year later. If there do happen to be gains in less salient or peripheral domains, they are from other sources, ie family socialization.
Measurement:
partisan affect strength:
(1) Candidate opinionation: like or dislike for candidate (carter, kennedy, reagan, bush)
(2) Candidate affect: intensity measure
(3) Party opinionation: evaluate party--4 questions
(4) Party affect: intensity of each eval.
partisan information measure:
(1) four factual questions regarding the candidates party affiliation
(2) ability to link party to corresponding symbols (14 of them)
(3) party-issue placement (4 specific issue questions)
crystalization measure:
most attention to the domains of insterest to campaign, and stability of attitudes of participations on these issues.
Findings:
Preadults
Affect (Wave 1, 2, 3)
(1) candidate opinionation (.83, .92, .95)
(2) intensity (2.02, 2.21, 2.29)
(3) party opinionation (.69, .79, .77)
(4) intensity (1.52, 1.73, 1.67)
Information
(1) candidates’ party (.49, .67, .66)
(2) party symbols (.39, .44, .50)
(3) party issue-placement (.41, .52, .64)
Attitude crystallization
(1) consistency of candidate evals (1.14, .97, .96)
(2) stability of candidate evals (1.02, .85, NA)
(3) consistency of party i.d. w candidate evals (1.55, 1.36, 1.27)
(4) consistency of party i.d. (.63, .67, .60)
Before election Preadults were partisan, but had little factual knowledge.
Preadult socialization gains during campaign: partisanship increased; party id became more crystallized; gained knowledge.
Preadult socialization after the campaign: measures of crystallization largely stops.
NO socialization gains in less salient domains.
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